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XII

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to § 78-2-2(3)0)
U.C.A.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Was the District Court correct in determining that the language in Midvale's

sexually oriented business [SOB] ordinance prohibiting the sale of products with a "central
theme" that depicts or describes sexual activities or specified anatomical areas without a
sexually oriented business license is not unconstitutionally vague?
2.

Was the District Court correct in determining that the language requiring an

SOB license for an establishment with the "principal purpose" of selling sexually oriented
items is not unconstitutionally vague?
3.

Was the District Court correct in determining that the doctrine of prior restraint

does not apply to the facts before the court because Dr. John's failed to apply for an SOB
license?
4.

Was the District Court correct in determining that Midvale's SOB ordinance

is not unconstitutionally overbroad?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND CASES AT ISSUE
Chapter 5.56 of the Midvale City Code [M.C.C.], entitled: "Sexually Oriented
Business" is at issue in the appeal. Appellant includes a version of this ordinance with the
date 9/98 as Addendum "A" of its brief. It is important to note that the ordinance included
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in the Appellant's brief is not the ordinance at issue on this appeal. Midvale's ordinance was
amended on August 16, 2000, nine months prior to the proceeding below.

In that

proceeding, counsel for Appellee introduced into evidence Plaintiffs Exhibit 6, which is a
copy of the amendments made to the ordinance, without objection from opposing counsel.
See Trial Transcript, Vol. I, page 51, lines 2-5, page 52, lines 1-5.l

The amendments

introduced below are attached hereto as Addendum "A".
The correct version of the ordinance includes a preamble that states the purposes of
the ordinance, as well as creates additional time limits on how long a city has to grant or
deny an SOB license. These additions counter several of the arguments raised by Appellant
on appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 14,2000 Midvale City received an application from defendant, John Haltom,
for a commercial business license for a commercial establishment known as Doctor John's,
Inc. See Trial Transcript, page 27, lines 4-13 (the Business License Application is attached
hereto as Addendum "C"). On this application Mr. Haltom described his business as a
lingerie, swimwear, rose, novelty and gift shop. Id. On June 15,2000, Ms. Shreeve, business
license administrator for Midvale City, asked Mr. Haltom for a definition of the novelties
he intended to sell at his new establishment. Mr. Haltom responded "candles and lotions"

!

A11 portions of the Trial Transcript referenced in this brief are included in
Addendum B.
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failing to mention adult videos, adult magazines, and sexual devices. See Trial Transcript,
Vol. I, page 5, lines 23-25; page 6, lines 1-5.
On June 28th, 2000, Ms. Shreeve accompanied a Midvale building official on a
building inspection of Mr. Haltom's store. During this visit Ms. Shreeve saw playing cards
with nude women, massage oils packaged for sexual purposes, i.e. Mr. Prolong and
Superglide, and books with specific sexual purposes, i.e. a picture book of Sensual Love.
See id. at Vol. I, page 28, line 23-25; page 29, line 1. Ms. Shreeve informed Mr. Haltom at
that time that he would have to apply for a sexually oriented business [SOB] license if he
intended on selling this type of product, or else remove them from his shelves. See id. at
Vol. I, page 28, lines 15-25; page 30, lines 1-6.
As a follow up, Ms. Shreeve wrote a letter to Mr. Haltom on June 28,2000, informing
him he would have to apply for an SOB license and sent him a copy of Midvale's SOB
ordinance. See Letter from Susan Shreeve to John Haltom of 6/28/00, attached hereto as
Addendum "D". She also informed him that his general business license application would
not be approved until he removed the sexually oriented products or applied for an SOB
license. Id.
After several communications on the phone, Mr. Haltom was personally notified by
the Midvale City Administrator, Midvale Economic Development Director, and Midvale
City Attorney that he would need to obtain a sexually oriented business license before
commencing operation of his business. See Trial Transcript, Vol. I, page 7, lines 16-20.
\\Joni\myfiles\UGT\Haltom\PLLADINGS\repIy brief sup ct corbin wpd
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Mr. Haltom never applied for an SOB license. See id. at Vol. I, page 16, lines 10-15.
Further, he never appealed the denial of his general business license as provided in M.C.C.
§ 5.04.050.2 See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, page 4 (R. 925).
On August 8th a temporary restraining order was issued which prohibited Mr. Haltom
from operating a commercial establishment known as Doctor John's Lingerie and Novelty
Boutique located at 6885 South State Street, Midvale, Utah. Id. On the date of the temporary
restraining order the parties appeared by counsel and agreed that if Mr. Haltom removed
from his shelves those things deemed to be sexually oriented products under the Midvale
City Code, the City would not take further action. Id. At this time a general business license
was issued. See Dr. John's Business License of 8/08/00, attached hereto as Addendum "E".
This agreement was complied with for a period of time, during which Mr. Haltom
was issued a general business license. However, on October 2, 2000, Ms. Vicki Seigal,
enforcement officer for Midvale City, entered the store and observed several hundred dildos
and several hundred vibrators, as well as anal beads and pleasure rings. See Trial Transcript
Vol. I, page 120, lines 7-25; page 121, lines 1-2. She again entered the store on October 20,

2

Section 5.04.050 reads:
If the license is denied or approved with qualifications, or if a
notice of suspension, revocation or citation of a civil fine is
imposed, the applicant or licensee may file an appeal with the
business license administrator.
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2000 and found the inventory had been increased to approximately five-hundred dildos,
twenty female genitalia devices, finger vibrators, pleasure rings, anal beads and other
sexually oriented paraphernalia. Id. at Vol. I, page 121, lines 13-25. On October 24, 2000
she again observed an increase of inventory to over three hundred genitalia devices and
several hundred more dildos. Id. at Vol. I, page 125, lines 12-14. Other city officials visited
the store during early November and observed similar items and quantities, as well as the
addition of adult videos. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, page 6 (R. 927).
A permanent injunction was subsequently sought for and granted during a bench trial
before Judge Leslie A. Lewis. See Judgement and Permanent Injunction, Appellant's brief,
Addendum "D".
Mr. Haltom has never applied for an SOB license. See Trial Transcript Vol. I, page
16, lines 10-15. According to M.C.C. § 5.56.040, "it is unlawful for any person to operate
a sexually oriented business ... without first obtaining a sexually oriented business license."
A sexually oriented business is defined as follows:
[A] commercial establishment . . . [w]hich, as one of its
principal purposes, offers for sale or rental, for any form of
consideration, any one or more of the following: books,
magazines, periodicals or other printed matter, or photographs,
films, motion pictures, video cassettes or video reproductions,
slides or other visual representations, the central theme of which
depicts or describes sexual activities or specified anatomical
areas; or instruments, devices or paraphernalia which are
designated for use in connection with specified sexual activities,
except for legitimate medically recognized contraceptives.
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M.C.C. §§ 5.56.010.
The M.C.C. provides the following remedies for violations of § 5.56.040:
An entity or individual who operates or causes to be operated a
sexually oriented business, without a valid license . . . or who
operates such a business or functions as such an employee in
violation of the provisions in this chapter, is subject to a suit for
injunction in addition to the civil and criminal violations
provided in this chapter, and any other remedy available in law
or in equity.
M.C.C. § 5.56.330 (emphasis added).
Dr. John's makes a facial challenge to Midvale's ordinance, arguing that the
ordinance is unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, and a prior restraint on free expression.
OPINION BELOW
The Honorable Judge Leslie A. Lewis held the following conclusions of law:
1.

Midvale City Code prohibits individuals from operating sexually oriented

businesses within Midvale City without first obtaining a sexually oriented business license.
2.

Midvale City Code defines a "sexually oriented business" as a commercial

establishment "[w]hich holds itself out to be such a business" or "which, as one of its
principal purposes, offers for sale or rental" sexually oriented products.
3.

Dr. John's, Inc., d/b/a Dr. John's Lingerie and Novelty Boutique, holds itself

out to be a sexually oriented business.
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4.

Based on the nature, quantity and category of products being sold at Dr.

John's, one of Dr. John's, Inc.'s, d/b/a Dr. John's Lingerie and Novelty Boutique, principal
purposes is the sale of sexually oriented products.
5.

Dr. John's Lingerie and Novelty Boutique is therefore a "sexually oriented

business" as defined and contemplated under the Midvale City Code.
6.

Defendants violated M.C.C. § 5.56.040 by operating a sexually oriented

business within Midvale City without having first obtained a sexually oriented business
license.
7.

The sale of lingerie and novelties by Dr. John's is unprotected commercial

speech.
8.

The videos sold by Dr. John's may qualify for marginal protection under the

First Amendment.
9.

The Midvale City Code's definition of sexually oriented business is not

unconstitutionally vague as it provides clear and precise notice and a clear indication to
anybody reading it of precisely what type of conduct is prohibited without first obtaining a
sexually oriented business license.
10.

The licensing requirements for sexually oriented businesses contained in the

Midvale City Code are not unconstitutionally overbroad.
11.

The licensing requirements for sexually oriented businesses contained in the

Midvale City Code do not constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech.
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12.

As the Defendant failed to apply for a sexually oriented business license before

engaging in its business operation, the prior restraint doctrine is not applicable to his case.
13.

Further, since the Midvale City ordinance is aimed at preventing unfavorable

secondary effects rather than the dissemination of expression, the prior restraint doctrine is
inapplicable to this case.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The District Court was correct in determining that Midvale's SOB ordinance is not
vague, overbroad, or a prior restraint on speech.
More specifically, the District Court was correct in determining that the sale of
sexually oriented products is only marginally protected under the First Amendment and that
the middle-tier scrutiny established in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) applies.
However, Appellee renews its arguments that the lower level of scrutiny afforded
commercial speech, established in Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S.
489, 497 (1981), also provides a secondary ground upon which the court could uphold the
ordinance. This argument is based on testimony from Mr. John R. Coil, Chief Financial
Officer of Dr. John's, stating that Dr. John's has no expressive intent with the sexual items
it sells beyond simply selling a product. Because Dr. John's concedes that it has no intent
at any expression, there is nothing for the First Amendment to protect, and the protection
afforded purely commercial speech applies.
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The District Court was correct in determining that Midvale's ordinance is a
constitutional content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction under O 'Brien: case law
establishes that it is within the constitutional power of the Government to pass such an
ordinance; the ordinance furthers the important or substantial governmental interest of
controlling the negative secondary effects (i.e. increased crime, loss of property value, etc.)
associated with SOBs; the ordinance is content-neutral because its purpose is to only regulate
the negative secondary effects of SOBs and is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and requiring a business to apply and obtain an SOB license to operate is only
an incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms that is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Dr. John's claim that Midvale has failed to show evidence of its legislative record that
establishes what studies it looked at to justify its concerns over negative secondary effects
was not properly preserved below and should not be considered in this appeal. The
argument was raised for the first time in closing arguments, after the close of evidence, when
it was impossible for Midvale to adequately respond. The District Court did not rule on the
issue, and Dr. John's failed to object, further precluding its claim. Further, had the issue
been properly raised Midvale could have easily met its evidentiary burden through the
ordinance's preamble that clearly states the ordinance's purpose, as well as presenting the
court with analogous case law relied on to draft the ordinance and evidence of the personal
experience of the City Council members, all of which have been recognized as reasonable
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evidence under Kenton evidentiary standards. See generally Kenton v. Playtime Theaters,
Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
The District Court was correct in determining that the ordinance is not overbroad.
Items with the "central theme" of depicting sexual activities, and a business with the
"primary purpose" of selling such items is clear to a person of common intelligence.
Further, Dr. John's vagueness claim is limited because he was repeatedly put on notice that
he was in violation of the ordinance, and also because the type and number of items he sold
(hundreds of dildos, pocket pussies, anal beads, and cock rings) were at the center of what
the ordinance is drafted to cover where no vagueness can be claimed.
The District Court was correct in determining that the doctrine of prior restraint does
not apply to the facts at hand because Dr. John's never applied for an SOB license. Further,
even if the doctrine did apply, Midvale's ordinance meets the procedural requirements to be
upheld as constitutional. First, it does not grant one authority "unbridled discretion" to deny
a license, but contains a detailed and prompt appeal process that has two levels of appeal.
Second, the ordinance provides for prompt judicial review of any denial, requiring that the
city grant or deny a license within forty-five days of filing. This time period has been upheld
in other jurisdictions as reasonable. Finally, Dr. John's argument that Midvale's ordinance
fails to leave open adequate alternative avenues of communication is not applicable to the
case at hand. This analysis is used in cases where cities include zoning restrictions on where
SOBs can locate (i.e. not within one thousand feet of a church or school, etc.). It requires
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a city to show that there are areas available notwithstanding the zoning, where an SOB can
be established. Midvale's ordinance does not contain any such zoning restriction and
therefore the adequate alternative avenues of communication does not apply.
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly established that injunctive relief is an appropriate
remedy against businesses that are operating without an appropriate business license. See
Ogden City v. Eagle Books, Inc. 586 P.2d 436 (Utah 1978).
Dr. John's arguments that it has a right of privacy to sell sexual novelties items, and
that this right should allow it to operate without a business license is misplaced. Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the principal case cited as support, established that
laws could not be upheld criminalizing the use of contraceptives in the marital home. The
court extended this right to include banning laws that would criminalize businesses that
wanted to sell medically recognized contraceptives as well. The case did not establish that
those businesses therefore had the right to sell contraceptives without an appropriate
business license, nor did it extend this privacy right to the sale of sexual novelty items.
Finally, Dr. John's state constitutional claims should be dismissed for a failure to
adequately raise or brief "different analysis" upon which a decision by this court could be
made. Dr. John's includes at the end of its forty-four page brief a suggestion that it "may
have" additional protection under Article I Section 15 of the Utah Constitution. Dr. John's
cites one Utah case and two cases from other jurisdictions that are not applicable to the case
at hand as support. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994), establishes the
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extensive nature of briefing required to raise a claim under the Utah Constitution (i.e.,
extensive state case law analysis, the text of the constitutional provision, and a thorough
historical analysis of the intent of the drafters of the Utah Constitution). Further, Dr. John's
must also provide the Court with different analysis than that done under Federal Law. Dr.
John's has failed to meet these standards. It's state constitutional claim is included as an
afterthought and should not be considered. Further, it would not be in keeping with this
court's jurisprudence, nor the intent of the constitutional drafters to extend additional
protection to the sale of sexual novelty items than that required by the First Amendment.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN DETERMINING THAT
THE SALE OF SEXUALLY ORIENTED PRODUCTS IS ONLY
MARGINALLY PROTECTED UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The first question before the Court is to determine if the conduct of selling sexually

oriented products is afforded First Amendment protection. The District Court held that the
sale of novelty items is unprotected commercial speech which falls beyond the ambit of First
Amendment protection. See Memorandum Decision, page 3 (R. 912) {citing Hoffman
Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1981)). However, the court
recognized that the sale of erotic videos may qualify for marginal protection under the First
Amendment. See id. Rather than analyze the products at issue on an individual basis the
court gave Dr. John's the benefit of the doubt and concluded that the sale of sexual novelty
items qualifies for First Amendment protection. See id. at page 4 (R.913).
l?
\\Joni\myfiles\UGT\Haltom\PLEADINGS\reply brief sup ct corbin v. pd

*• *<

Appellee renews its argument below that the facts of this case clearly establish Dr.
John's is only engaged in the purely commercial exploitation of sexually oriented products,
with no intent to express any message beyond merely making a sale. Therefore, there is no
speech interest at issue and Dr. John's conduct does not qualify for First Amendment
protection.
In Hoffman, the Supreme Court upheld an ordinance that required a special license
in order to sell "any items, effect, paraphernalia, accessory or thing" related to illegal
cannabis or drugs. 455 U.S. at 492. The Flipside, a store that sold this type of product,
argued that the ordinance was vague, and also overbroad because it restricted the sale of
these items, the designs and logos of which it claimed were protected First Amendment
expression. See generally id.
The court held that in a facial challenge "a court's first task is to determine whether
the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct." Id. at
494-495 (emphasis added). The court held that the designs and logos on the products sold
did not qualify as expression under the First Amendment, and that simply selling a product
without any expressive intent is commercial speech, thus falling beyond the ambit of First
Amendment protection. See id.
In a like manner, Dr. John's has no expressive intent in the novelty items or videos
that it sells. This was clearly established in the testimony of Mr. John R. Coil, Chief
Financial Officer of Dr. John's, who stated during the bench trial that Dr. John's has no
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expressive intent through any of its products beyond simply making a sale. Mr. Coil testified
that, "Our purpose in buying this stuff is to sell it, and when it goes out the door we could
care less, it's irrelevant. We bring it in, we sell it, end of purpose." Trial Transcript Volume
II, page 351, lines 8-23.
By conceding this crucial point, Mr. Coil established that there is no speech interest
to protect. Like Flipside in Hoffman, Dr. John's is simply engaged in the commercial
exploitation of sexually oriented products, which is clearly outside of the circumference of
the First Amendment. There is no untrammeled political debate going on. There is no erotic
message being communicated. In the eyes of Dr. John's there is simply no communication
taking place. By its own testimony it clearly established that it brings products in and sells
them, end of purpose. This is the perfect definition of commercial speech.
Therefore, Midvale renews the argument that Hoffman is controlling, and that it
affords this Court a secondary ground upon which it could uphold the ordinance. See
generally Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231,241 (Utah 1993) (The reviewing court
may also affirm on any ground available to the trial court regardless of whether it was relied
upon in reaching the decision from which an appeal is sought).
Relying on Hoffman would allow the Court to apply the lowest level of scrutiny
available to it.

In situations where the conduct being regulated has no communicative

intent, the standard is as follows:
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In a facial challenge to the overbreadth and vagueness of a law,
a court's first task is to determine whether the enactment
reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected
conduct. If it does not, then the overbreadth challenge must fail.
The court should then examine the facial vagueness challenge,
and assuming the enactment implicates no constitutionally
protected conduct, should uphold the challenge only if the
enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.
Id. at 494-495. The standard in Hoffman makes Dr. John's overbreadth claim moot, and
requires him to show that the Midvale ordinance is unconstitutionally vague in all of its
applications. The statute clearly passes constitutional muster under this analysis. Midvale
raises this claim only as a secondary basis to its main arguments that the District Court
correctly applied the middle-tier level of scrutiny established in O 'Brien.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT MID VALE'S
SOB ORDINANCE IS SUBJECT TO MIDDLE-TIER SCRUTINY
If the court determines that the sale of sexually oriented products qualifies for First

Amendment protection, the next question that must be resolved is what level of protection
it should be afforded. The District Court was correct in rejecting Dr. John's argument that
the sale of sexually oriented products is "clearly protected First Amendment expressive
activity" subject to strict scrutiny,3 and instead recognizing that sexually oriented businesses

3

The United States Supreme Court has created three levels of scrutiny when
dealing with a First Amendment facial challenge to an ordinance on the grounds that the
ordinance is unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, or a prior restraint. In deciding which
level of scrutiny applies, the first question is whether the ordinance is aimed at the
repression of expression. See Johnson v. Texas, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (where a statute
making it a crime to burn the American flag was stricken down as a repression of
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enjoy only marginal protection under the First Amendment with respect to the materials that
they sell, making Mid vale's ordinance subject to the middle-tier scrutiny established in U.S.
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See Memorandum Decision, pages 4-5 (R. 913-914).
It is well established that the sale of sexually oriented items is granted only marginal
First Amendment protection. Such expression has consistently been subordinated and given
considerably less protection than such recognized core First Amendment areas as political,
social, and religious expressions. In Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., All U.S. 50
(1976) (plurality opinion) (where two adult theaters challenged an ordinance that required
a special license to operate an adult business and restricted adult theaters from locating
within 1000 feet of another adult theater), the court stated, "There is surely less vital interest
in the uninhibited exhibition of material that is on the borderline between pornography and
artistic expression than in the free dissemination of ideas of social and political significance."
Id. at 61. Stating further,
Moreover, even though we recognize that the First Amendment
will not tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that
have some arguably artistic value, it is manifest that society's
interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly

expression). If an ordinance is aimed at the suppression of content it is considered
content-based and "presumptively violates the First Amendment." Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. Members ofN.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.9 502 U.S. 105, (1991) (where a New
York Statute that prohibited criminals from selling their stories for money was stricken
down). A content-based interest is unconstitutional unless "necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and . . . narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Perry Educ.
Adsss'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S 37, 45 (1983).
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different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled
political debate that inspired Voltaire's immortal comment4. ..
. But few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war
to preserve the citizen's right to see "Specified Sexual
Activities" exhibited in the theaters of our choice. Even though
the First Amendment protects communication in this area from
total suppression, we hold that the State may legitimately use
the content of these materials as the basis for placing them in a
different classification from other motion pictures.
See id. at 70-71. The court concluded "The mere fact that the commercial exploitation of
material protected by the First Amendment is subject to zoning and other licensing
requirements is not a sufficient reason for invalidating these ordinances." Id. at 62.
The subordination of sexually oriented expression was upheld in Renton v. Playtime
Theaters, Inc., 415 U.S. 41,49 n.2 (1986) (quoting Young, All U.S. 70-71); and again more
recently in City of Erie v. PAP's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 281 (2000) (a case describing public
nude dancing as expressive conduct, held that"... we think that it falls only within the outer
ambit of the First Amendment's protection.").
In determining that the sale of sexually oriented products is afforded only marginal
protection under the First Amendment, the District Court then correctly rejected Dr. John's
argument that strict scrutiny applies, and applied the middle-tier level of review. The case
law is abundant to support the appropriateness of this level of scrutiny to SOB ordinances.5

4

I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.

5

See generally Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, (1986); Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc. All U.S. 50 (1976); TK'S Video, Inc. v. Denton County,
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Therefore, the District Court should be upheld in determining that the sale of sexually
oriented items is only marginally protected under the First Amendment and that middle-tier
standards applicable to "content-neutral time, place, and manner" regulations apply.
in.

MID VALE'S ORDINANCE IS A VALID "TIME, PLACE, AND MANNER55
REGULATION THAT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID UNDER THE
O'BRIEN TEST
The District Court was correct in applying the middle-tier standard of review

established in O 'Brien, and determining that Midvale's SOB ordinance is a constitutionally
valid content-neutral "time, place and manner" restriction.
The United States Supreme Court has affirmed that municipalities, in the interest of
preventing negative secondary effects (such as crime and conduct harmful to public health,
safety and welfare, etc.), may regulate SOBs through content-neutral licensing ordinances.
See generally Kenton, 475 U.S at 47 (where the court held an SOB ordinance that restricted
adult theaters to 1000 feet of residential homes, parks, or schools to be a form of time, place,
and manner regulation). The Kenton court stated, "On the other hand, so-called "contentneutral" time, place, and manner regulations are acceptable so long as they are designed to
serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues
of communication." Id.

Tex., 24 F.3d 705 (5th Cir. 1994); City of Colorado Springs v. Baby Dolls, 896 P.2d 272
(Co. 1995); The People v. Library One, 229 Cal. App. 3d 973 (1991); City of National
City v. Steven D. Weiner, 838 P.2d 223 (Cal. 1992).
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Midvale's ordinance qualifies as a content-neutral licensing statute. United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S 367 (1968)6 provides the framework for distinguishing whether an
ordinance operates to repress the content of certain speech, or whether its aim is to diminish
the negative secondary effects that accompany certain expression with no interest in
suppressing the content of the message conveyed. O 'Brien sets out the following four-prong
test:
Government regulation is sufficiently justified if:
1)

it is within the constitutional power of the Government;

2)

if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest;

3)

if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and

4)

if the incidental restriction on alleged first amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest.

Id. at 377.
Midvale's SOB ordinance is a constitutionally valid content-neutral licensing statute
and should be upheld under the requirements set forth in O'Brien. First, concerning the

6

In O'Brien, the defendant challenged a statute that criminalized the burning of a
draft card by walking onto the local courthouse steps and burning his in political protest
of the Vietnam war. The court upheld the statute as a valid content neutral time, place
and manner restriction because the statute was not aimed at repressing the political
expression, but only aimed at controlling the negative secondary effects of a disorderly
draft.
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requirement that the government have constitutional power to pass the ordinance, "[T]here
is no constitutional impediment to the concept of requiring sexually oriented businesses to
obtain licenses and pay reasonable fees." Dumas v. City of Dallas, 648 F.Supp. 1061, 1073
(N.D.Tex. 1986).
Second, under the prong requiring the ordinance to further a substantial or important
governmental interest, the ordinance's preamble states the following important governmental
interests:
This section shall be construed consistent with the governmental
interest of the City in protecting its citizens from increased
crime in the preservation of its quality of life and property
values and the character of the City's neighborhoods and
businesses; and to deter the spread of urban blight and to protect
against the spread of sexually transmitted diseases.
M.C.C. § 5.56.000. Protection against the secondary effects of SOB's, "such as impacts on
public health, safety, and welfare," has been recognized as a legitimate governmental
interest. See Kenton, 475 U.S. at 47-48.
Next, under the third prong, the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression because it focuses only on protecting Midvale from the secondary effects
of SOBs (i.e. increased crime, decreasing property values, etc.), and is not written in any way
to censor what is being sold. The United States Supreme Court has recognized similar
ordinances seeking to protect against similar secondary effects as being unrelated to the
suppression of speech. See, PAPS, 529 U.S at 291 (quoting Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,
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501 U.S., 560,585 (1991)) ("on its face, the governmental interest in combating prostitution
and other criminal activity [associated with SOBs] is not at all inherently related to
expression.")
Put another way, the ordinance does not attempt to regulate the primary effects of the
expression, e.g. what is being sold, or what is being done with what is being sold, but rather
the secondary effects of SOBs on the community generally, such as the impacts on public
health, safety, and welfare. The ordinance itself does not restrict expression in any way. It
simply requires that a license be obtained in an effort to control the secondary effects of such
a business on the neighborhood. Since it is the secondary effects of SOBs that are being
regulated, and not the content of any intended expression, the third prong is met.
Finally, there is no incidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms. Midvale's
ordinance does not limit Dr. John's ability to sell its product. All that Midvale requires is
that he apply and receive a sexually oriented business license. The ordinance does not limit
the number of SOBs that may locate in Midvale; does not contain zoning requirements on
where an SOB may locate; or place restrictions on the type or quantity of product SOBs want
to sell. All the ordinance requires is that a business simply apply for a license, which is not
a restriction on speech.
Further, even if obtaining an SOB license could be viewed as an incidental restraint,
it is de minimus and not sufficient to render the ordinance as content based. See id. 529 U.S.
at 294 ("If states are to be able to regulate secondary effects, then de minimus intrusions on
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expression such as those at issue here [requiring pasties and g-stings] cannot be sufficient
to render the ordinance content based.") (citing Clark v. Community for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288, 299 (1984); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989)). The District Court correctly held, "Moreover, the ordinance's effect is mitigated
and is de minimus in its impact on expression, because it permits the sale of sexually
oriented products upon proper application and licensure." Memorandum Decision, page 6
(R. 915).
Midvale's ordinance satisfies the four part test set forth in O'Brien and therefore
qualifies as a content-neutral licensing statute that should be upheld.
A.

Dr. John's claims that the City of Midvale has failed to present its
legislative record showing it did adequate study to establish the negative
secondary effects of SOBs was not raised nor ruled on below and should
not be considered by this Court

In point four of Dr. John's brief it argues that Midvale has the burden of proof of
showing that its SOB ordinance is related in some substantial way to controlling the negative
secondary effects that it recites as its justification for the ordinance. This argument fails for
two reasons.
First, the argument was not adequately raised below and was therefore not preserved
for appeal. "To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must timely bring the issue
to the attention of the trial court, thus providing the court an opportunity to rule on the issue's
merits." See Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667,672 (Utah

11
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1982); see also James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799,801 -02 (Utah App. 1987). "Issues not raised
in the trial court in a timely fashion are deemed waived, precluding [the appellate court] from
considering their merits on appeal." Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah
App.1989); accord Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 837 (Utah 1984);
Franklin Fin. v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983).
Not only was it not raised below, but it wasn't mentioned in the pleadings. However,
even if it was, the mere mention of an issue in the pleadings, when no supporting evidence
or relevant legal authority is introduced at trial in support of the claim, is insufficient to raise
an issue at trial and thus insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. See generally James,
746 P.2d at 801. This rule is "stringently applied when the new theory depends on
controverted factual questions whose relevance thereto was not made to appear at trial." Id.
(quoting Bogacki v. Board of Supervisors, 489 P.2d 537, 543-44, (1971), cert, denied, 405
U.S. 1030, 92 S.Ct. 1301, 31 L.Ed.2d 488 (1972)).
Dr. John's did not timely raise its claim that the city had the burden to present
evidence of the studies it relied on. The first time the claim was even mentioned was during
closing arguments. The issue was not raised in Dr. John's answer and cross-claim, was not
briefed in its trial memorandum, was not mentioned in Dr. John's opening statement, and
no questions were asked of any witness eliciting evidence that the negative secondary effects
claimed by the city were fraudulent. In its closing Dr. John's argued for the first time that
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the city had the burden of presenting its legislative record to show what it based its belief of
negative secondary effects on. In response to this argument counsel for the Appellee stated,
MR. HATHAWAY: "I believe that counsel argued unless the
concern is raised that for whatever reason the conclusion is
reached by the legislative body or not to support (inaudible).
That hasn't been challenged here. Nobody has argued, "You're
wrong, there's no common in crime increase, there's no blight
in the neighborhood, there's no sexually transmitted disease."
THE COURT:

"So there's no need to rebut, then."

See Trial Transcript Vol. II, page 394, lines 24-25, page 395, lines 1-6.
The District Court did not address the argument in its memorandum decision nor in
its findings of fact and conclusions of law, showing that the issue had not been raised to the
"level of consciousness" necessary for the judge to consider it. See generally James, 746
P.2d at 802. Further, Dr. John's failed to object to the omission of a ruling on this claim
below, further precluding its claim. In James the court held that a failure to object to a
failure to make a ruling waives the claim because the objection is necessary to bring the
potential mistake to the "level of consciousness" necessary for the judge to consider it. Id.
("Further, James made no objection to the trial court's failure to rule on the issue . . . The
trial court made no ruling as to the existence of an equitable mortgage and James made no
objection to this omission.").
Dr. John's attempt to raise this claim in its closing below, and now again on appeal
is subterfuge designed to limit the City's ability to present evidence necessary to respond.
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Dr. John's raised this argument only after the close of all evidence, when it was obvious that
the City would have no opportunity to provide rebuttal evidence. The District Court did not
address the claim because it simply was not an issue placed before it.
However, even if the claim were properly preserved, Dr. John's misstates the
evidentiary requirements of Renton, and the City's burden to show what studies it relied on
in passing the ordinance. Dr. John's argues that evidence of legislative intent is required
to justify Renton-type restrictions, while ignoring the fact that the Supreme Court has
recognized language in an ordinances preamble that states the purposes of the ordinance is
as sufficient to meet Renton 's requirements.
In Young the Supreme Court discussed the preamble of an ordinance similar to that
contained in Midvale's,7 noting that "on the basis of the reasons stated by the city for
adopting the ordinances, the court concluded that they represented a rational attempt to
preserve the city's neighborhood." 427 U.S. at 55-56. In a footnote the Supreme Court

7

M.C.C. § 5.56.00, entitled "Purpose of Section," states:
It is the purpose and object of this section that the City
establish reasonable and uniform regulations governing the
time, place, and manner of operation of sexually oriented
businesses and their employees in the City. This Section
shall be construed consistent with the government interests of
the City in protecting its citizens from increased crime in the
preservation of its quality of life and property values and the
character of the City's neighborhoods and businesses; and to
deter the spread of urban blight and to protect against the
spread of sexually transmitted diseases.
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quoted the District Court, stating: "[w]hen, as here, the City has stated a reason for adopting
an ordinance which is a subject of legitimate concern, that statement of purpose is not subject
to attack." id. at 56, n. 11.
In PAPS, the Court held, "And in terms of demonstrating that such secondary effects
pose a threat, the city need not "conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that
already generated by other cities" to demonstrate the problem of secondary effects, "so long
as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem
that the city addresses." 529 U.S. at 296 {citing Kenton 475 U.S. at 51-52).
Further, the PAPS court established that "The city council members, familiar with
commercial downtown Erie, are the individuals who would likely have had firsthand
knowledge of what took place at and around nude dancing establishments in Erie, and can
make particularized, expert judgements about the resulting harmful secondary effects." Id.
at 297-298 (emphasis added). The court continued,
Here, Kandyland has had ample opportunity to contest the
council's finding about secondary effects - before the council
itself, through the state proceedings, and before this Court. Yet
to this day, Kandyland has never challenged the city council's
findings or cast any specific doubt on the validity of those
findings. Instead, it has simply asserted that the council's
evidentiary proof was lacking. In the absence of any reason to
doubt it, the city's expert judgement should be credited.
Id. at 298.

Relying on city council members as experts was followed in Thames

Entertainment, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 851 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1988), where the court held
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that it is sufficient for a legislator to rely on his "personal experience [that] adult
establishments tended to attract transients and that their location in a neighborhood was not
conducive to neighborhood revitalization . . . Personal observations of a legislator . . .
certainly fall within the category of experience that can be properly considered by a
legislative body in enacting an ordinance [and] qualify as the evidence recognized in
Renton." Id. at 201-202.
Also, in PAPS, the Supreme Court established that a city can rely on past case law as
evidence of the potential for negative secondary effects,
Because the nude dancing at Kandyland is of the same character
as the adult entertainment at issue in Renton, Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc. 427 U.S. 50 (1976), and
California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972), it was reasonable for
Erie to conclude that such nude dancing was likely to produce
the same secondary effects. And Erie could reasonably rely on
the evidentiary foundation set forth in Renton and American
Mini Theatres to the effect that secondary effects are caused by
the presence of even one adult entertainment establishment in
a given neighborhood.
529 U.S. at 296-297.

The court concluded ". . . the evidentiary standard described in

Renton controls here, and Erie meets that standard." Id.
Had this claim been properly raised, briefed, and argued by Dr. John's, the City could
have easily demonstrated through the ordinance's preamble, case law relied on to draft the
ordinance, and the expert judgement of the city council members that the negative secondary
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effects mentioned in the preamble are legitimate.

Since Dr. John's

has failed to

substantially challenge the City's findings, the judgement of the City should be upheld.
Dr. John's cites Tollis v. San Bernadino County, 827 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1987) as
support for the proposition that a city must demonstrate what studies it relied on in justifying
the regulation. This case is distinct because the ordinance at issue in Tollis did not contain
a preamble that clearly stated the purpose of the ordinance, which would have subjected the
analysis to the conclusion of the Supreme Court's decision in Young ("[w]hen, as here, the
City has stated a reason for adopting an ordinance which is a subject of legitimate concern,
that statement of purpose is not subject to attack.") Id. at 56, n. 11. The court was therefore
left to guess at what the purpose of the ordinance was, and since no evidence was offered by
the city, the statute was struck down. Midvale has not been so careless. The ordinance's
preamble clearly states its purpose, and the City's reasons are therefore subject to the
protection of Young,
Dr. John's also cites SDJ, Inc. v. City ofHoustonf 837 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1988), cert,
denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989) (where the court considered whether a city looked at studies
that specifically cited the secondary effects of topless bars, determining that a study done
several years prior to the passage of the ordinance was sufficient to meet Kenton evidentiary
requirements) as support for the same principle. Once again, the case did not deal with an
ordinance that contained a preamble wherein the purposes were clearly stated.
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MDI1Entertainment, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 935 F.Supp. 1384 (N.D.Tex. 1995) is also
inapplicable to the case at bar. No claims have been made that Midvale sought to justify its
ordinance based on a study performed after the passage of the ordinance. To the contrary,
had evidence been presented on this issue it would have shown what cases the city attorneys
relied on in drafting the ordinance.
The preamble of the ordinance is sufficient evidence under Young to establish the
reasonable purposes of Midvale. Further, since the Dr. John's has failed to substantially
challenge the findings of the City in any material way, the judgement of the city council
members should be held as sufficient for Kenton purposes. Therefore, even if the issue were
properly preserved below, Midvale's ordinance still passes constitutional muster and should
be upheld.
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN DETERMINING THAT
MID VALE'S SOB ORDINANCE IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE
Dr. John's argues that two aspects of the Midvale City Ordinance are

unconstitutionally vague: 1) the prohibition of the sale of items that have the "central theme"
of depicting or describing sexual activities or specified anatomical areas; and 2) the
requirement to obtain an SOB license if the business has as "one of its principal purposes"
the sale of sexually oriented products. Dr. John's claims that it is impossible to tell what
the central theme of a book, picture, or film is, thus leaving total discretion to the reviewing
officer to decide how the ordinance will be interpreted. Dr. John's further argues that the
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"principal purpose" standard is nebulas and does not put a business owner on notice of how
many of these items he can sale before it becomes a "principle purpose" of the establishment.
Both arguments are mere stratagem with the intent of covering over two key facts that
bar Mr. Haltom's claim: 1) he was put on notice that he was in violation of the statute, see
Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 499 ("[The United States Supreme Court] has recognized that a
scienter requirement may mitigate a law's vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy
of notice to the complainant that his conduct is proscribed."); and 2) the type and amount of
items he was selling were at the hard core of the statute, see id. at 494-495 (Where a person
"engages in some conduct that is clearly prescribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the
law as applied to the conduct of others.")
The record below establishes that Mr. Haltom was put on notice that he was in
violation of the ordinance, {see Addendum "C"), and that the items he sold (i.e. The Picture
Book of Sensual Love, hundreds of dildos and "pocket pussies," anal beads and cock rings)
were not on the periphery of the ordinance, but at its core. See Trial Transcript, page 120,
lines 7-25. The District Court was correct in determining that ordinance is not vague.
"The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause requires that the legislation
prohibiting particular conduct contain language that provides fair notice and warning and
sets reasonably clear guidelines for those enforcing and adjudicating under the legislation."
Dodger's Bar & Grill, Inc. v. Johnson County Bd. Of County Comm frs, 32 F.3d 1436, 1443
(10th Cir. 1994) (where a bar unsuccessfully brought an action challenging the language
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"performing acts of or acts which constitute or simulate: the touching caressing or fondling
of the breast [or] buttocks" as vague); citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73, 94
S.Ct. 1242,1246-47,39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974). The prohibitions must be "set out in terms that
the ordinary common person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand
and comply with, without sacrifice to the public interest." United States Civil Serv. Comm 'n
v. National Ass n ofLetter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,579,93 S.Ct. 2880,2897,37 L.Ed.2d 796
(1973) (where a statute prohibiting participation in "political activity" was held to be vague
and overbroad).
With an emphasis on common sense, the United States Supreme Court has also
recognized that "we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language." Grayned
v. City ofRockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (where the language "tends to disturb" in an
antinoise statute was upheld against a vagueness claim). Also, in Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601 (1972) (where language such as "partisan," "takes part in," or "affairs o f were
unsuccessfully challenged as vague) the United States Supreme Court stated,
Words inevitably contain germs of uncertainty . . . there may be
disputes over the meaning of such terms in § 818 as "partisan,"
or "takes part in," or "affairs o f political parties. But what was
said in Letter Carriers, ante, at 578-579, is applicable here:
"there are limitations in the English language with respect to
being both specific and manageably brief, and it seems to us
that although the prohibitions may not satisfy those intent on
finding fault at any cost, they are set out in terms that the
ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can
sufficiently understand and comply with, without sacrifice to the
public interest." Moreover, even if the outermost boundaries of
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§ 818 may be imprecise, any such uncertainty has little
relevance here, where appellants' conduct falls squarely within
the "hard core" of the statute's proscriptions and appellants
concede as much, [citations omitted]
Id. at 608 (emphasis added). The court stated further that
It is significant in this respect to note that § 818 does not create
a "regulatory maze" where those uncertain may become
hopelessly lost, (citations omitted) Rather, the State Personnel
Board is available to rule in advance on the permissibility of
particular conduct under the explicit standards set out in and
under §818.
Id. Broadrick places further restrictions on a vagueness review in two ways: 1) Dr. John's
cannot claim the ordinance is vague if the product he was selling unquestionably had a
"central theme" that depicts or describes sexual activities or specified anatomical areas, or
if the number of items he sold that had this central theme was so pervasive that there was no
question it was a principle purpose of the business; and 2) since the ordinance allows for an
appeal of any denial of a license application or grievance, Mr. Haltom cannot claim that the
ordinance is vague without first appealing the meaning to the appropriate review board,
which he never did.
Further, in contrast to Dr. John's claim that strict scrutiny applies to a claim of
vagueness in the area of the first amendment, Hoffman establishes, "Economic regulation
is subject to a less strict vagueness test because its subject matter is often more narrow, and
because businesses, which face economic demands to plan behavior carefully, can be
expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of action." See Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 498.
X)
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Beyond these limitations, the Grayned court, established the following principles of
vagueness review:
1)

"When faced with a vague statute . . . [the court] must 'extrapolate its
allowable meaning,'" and that in doing so it would consider:
A)
B)
C)

the words of the ordinance itself;
the interpretation given by the court below to analogous statutes; and
perhaps to some degree, to the interpretation given by those charged
with enforcing it. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110.

2)

The words of the ordinance can be marked by "flexibility and reasonable
breadth, rather than meticulous specificity," as long as it is clear what the
ordinance as a whole prohibits. Id. (citing Esteban v. Central Missouri State
College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1088 (CA8 1969) Blackmun, J. Cert. Denied, 398
U.S. 965 (1970))

3)

The ordinance should be viewed in the "particular context" for which it was
written, and adequate notice should be viewed through the eyes of "those to
whom [it] is directed." Id. (citing American Communications Assn. v. Douds,
399 U.S. at 412.)

The language challenged by petitioner is not vague under the standards discussed
above. The standards will be applied to Dr. John's two vagueness challenges in turn.
A.

The District Court was correct in determining that items with the
"central theme" of depicting or describing sexual activities or specified
anatomical areas is sufficiently clear to give a man of common intelligence
notice of what is not allowed

Dr. John's claim that a prohibition of the sale of items with the "central theme" of
depicting or describing sexual activities or specified anatomical areas is vague ignores case
law and common sense.
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First, the United States Supreme Court has upheld similar language to the "central
theme" language contained in the Midvale ordinance. In Young v. American Mini Theaters,
All U.S. 50 (1976) (where an adult theater unsuccessfully argued that language requiring
a license to show movies "characterized by an emphasis" on "specified sexual activities or
specified anatomical areas" was vague), the court stated,
As already noted, the only vagueness in the ordinance relates to
the amount of sexually explicit activity that may be portrayed
before the material can be said to be "characterized by an
emphasis" on such matter. For most films the question will be
readily answerable; to the extent that an area of doubt exists, we
see no reason why the ordinances are not "readily subject to a
narrowing construction by the state courts."
Id. at 61. As stated in Young, in most cases, what Midvale's ordinance covers will be
"readily answerable" (i.e. hundreds of dildos and pocket pussies). In areas where there
might be dispute the ordinance is readily subject to a narrowing construction of the
administrative body as provided for in the ordinance (which was never appealed to due to
the fact that Dr. John's never applied for an SOB license).
A video or card with a "central theme" of depicting or describing sexual activities
or specified anatomical areas, is sufficiently clear to put a person with common sense on
notice of what is and is not allowed, especially in the "particular context" of putting John
Haltom on notice who has owned nine other SOBs in different states, {see Trial Transcript,
Vol. II, page 239, line 17-20), and who was informed in writing that he needed to get an
SOB license or remove items from his shelves. See Addendum "C".
\\Joni\myfiles\UGT\Haltom\PLEADINGS\reply bnef.sup ct.corbin.wpd

* ^

Further, when read with the entirety of the statute, the challenged language cannot be
said to be vague. The words of the ordinance can be marked by "flexibility and reasonable
breadth, rather than meticulous specificity," as long as it is clear what the ordinance as a
whole prohibits. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110.
The ordinance states that the sale of such items must be a principal purpose of the
business, and therefore the "central theme" standard will be applied to classes of items,
where it will be extremely clear (as the case here) that the establishment is an SOB. This
interpretation is supported by testimony given by Susan Shreeve, Midvale City's business
license administrator, wherein she stated that it was not the existence of one sexually
oriented item that made the ordinance applicable, but the existence of different items being
sold together that made the ordinance apply. See Trial Transcript page 74, lines 6-12. Dr.
John's misrepresents the proceeding below throughout its brief by stating that the ordinance
as a whole "prohibits the sale of one deck of nude playing cards" and that it is impossible
to determine what articles are prohibited under the statute and what are not. This argument
ignores the additional restriction of the principal purpose language of the ordinance.
Further, Dr. John's argument that Susan Shreeve has total discretion to determine how
the ordinance will be applied, justifying its failure to apply for a license on the claim that her
interpretation of the statute is that not even one sexual item can be sold, is not supported by
the facts. This argument ignores the ordinance's provisions for appeal and the simple fact
that Dr. John's never used them because he never applied for an SOB license.
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Therefore, when viewed in conjunction with the further limitation of the principal
purpose language, the central theme standard is not vague, and what the ordinance prohibits
is clear.
Third, Hoffman establishes two further hurdles to a vagueness claim that are mortal
to Dr. John's claim. First, the statute should not be stricken down if an administrative
process is in place that could clarify its meaning ("Indeed, the regulated enterprise may have
the ability to clarify the meaning of the regulation by its own inquiry, or by resort to an
administrative process.") See Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 499. Midvale's ordinance has in place
section 5.04.050 which reads:
If the license is denied or approved with qualifications, or if a
notice of suspension, revocation or citation of a civil fine is
imposed, the applicant or licensee may file an appeal with the
business license administrator.
Id. Dr. John's never applied for a sexually oriented business license, and never appealed
Midvale's initial denial of the general business license, thus limiting its power to raise a
vagueness claim.
Further, the complainant should not be allowed to claim vagueness where notice was
adequate that he was in violation of the ordinance. The United States Supreme Court uhas
recognized that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law's vagueness, especially with
respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his conduct is proscribed."
Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 499. The record is replete with evidence that from the very first
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inspection Dr. John's was informed that it was in violation of the statute. See Trial
Transcript page 30, lines 2-15, page 37, lines 10-20,page 42, lines3-14. It should therefore
be barred from arguing that the statute is vague because it knew Midvale considered the
novelty items being sold as having the "central theme" of depicting what the statute would
not allow.
Also, Dr. John's argument that it should have been allowed to analogize what other
stores around its store were selling is not supported by law. A person "who engages in some
conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to
the conduct of others. A court should therefore examine the complainant's conduct before
analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law." Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 498. How can
it be argued that products such as "The Picture Book of Sensual Love," hundreds of dildos
and "pocket pussies," anal beads and cock rings, do not have the "central theme" of
depicting or describing sexual activities or specified anatomical areas? It is unnecessary for
the court to consider hypothetical applications when the evidence before it is clear that the
statute applies.
Dr. John's cites Wil-Car, Inc. v. Village of Germantown, 153 F.Supp. 982 (E.D.Wis.
2001) as support for its argument that the District Court erred in denying its attempt to
introduce what other stores in the neighborhood were selling.

The case is clearly

distinguishable. In Wil-Car the court analyzed the ordinance in question under a strict
scrutiny analysis because the city conceded that the purpose of its SOB ordinance was not
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to combat negative secondary effects but to combat the pornography industry. See id. at 988.
The evidence of how the statute had been applied in the past was considered in the context
of a narrowing the language of the statute to avoid striking it down as being overbroad. The
city argued that the language could be narrowed through a "well-understood and uniformly
applied practice" that was established by past application. Id. at 993. In this context the
court had no choice but to consider the past application of the ordinance and how it had been
applied in other instances. What the court found was that the ordinance had existed for
almost eight years and had never once been applied.
In the case at bar, Midvale makes no claim that the statute needs to be narrowed
through its uniformly applied practice. It stands by the clear language of the statute as
sufficient to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Further, Dr. John's citation of Wil-Car is
misplaced because it fails to recognize that the evidence being sought by the court in WilCar was concrete (how the ordinance had been applied in the past), whereas Dr. John's
wanted to present evidence under the guise of a hypothetical, or how it would be applied in
the future (how would you apply the ordinance if you saw this?). The court was correct in
denying this attempt to be drawn into hypothetical application of the law. See Hoffman, 455
U.S. at 494-495 (Where a person "engages in some conduct that is clearly prescribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others. A court should
therefore examine the complainant's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical
applications of the law.")
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The language "central theme" is not unconstitutionally vague. Similar language has
been upheld by the United States Supreme Court. Further, it cannot be said to be vague in
Dr. John's case where the items he was selling were at the "hard core" of the statutory
definition. The District Court's ruling should therefore be upheld and Dr. John's claim that
the Midvale ordinance is unconstitutionally vague should be denied.
B.

Requiring an SOB license if the businesses "principal purpose" is to sell
sexually oriented products is not vague and has been upheld in other
cases as sufficiently clear

The major thrust of Petitioner's argument is that there is no way of knowing if one's
business has the "principal purpose" of selling sexually oriented products or not. It claims
that without a more definite statement it is impossible to know if a business falls within the
parameters of the statute.
Dr. John's fails to recognize that the United States Supreme Court, as well as other
District Court s, have upheld flexible language similar to that used in the Midvale ordinance
in analyzing vagueness challenges, including "principal business purpose," "characterized
by an emphasis on," and "major business." See Dumas v. City of Dallas, 648 F.Supp 1061,
1076 (N.D.Tex. m6),affd,FW/PBS,Inc.v.

City ofDallas, 837 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir. 1988),

rev'd on other grounds, 493 U.S. 215 (1990) ("principal business purpose"); Young v.
American Mini Theaters, Inc., All U.S. 50 (1976) ("characterized by an emphasis on");
Stansbury v. Holmes, 613 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir. 1990) ("major business").
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Further, as stated above, the hurdles of Hoffman apply (can't claim vagueness if
administrative process is in place; and can't claim vagueness if given adequate notice that
ordinance applies to you). Dr. John's did not take advantage of the administrative process
available to get clarification, did not file for an SOB license, and did not appeal the denial
of his general business license.
Dr. John's argues that other SOB ordinances in the area include a square footage
requirement as further defining principle purpose, and that due to the absence of such a
limitation Midvale's ordinance is vague. Dr. John's is barred from making this argument
because he successfully objected to referring to other SOB ordinances below, on the grounds
that other SOB ordinances are irrelevant. See Trial Transcript, Vol. II, page 369, lines 15-25,
page 370, lines 1-16.8

8

The following exchange occurred during the bench trial:

Mr. Fahle:

I have to object to this, given this Court's consistent ruling
throughout this trial, this Court's consistent rulings that we're
talking about the law in Midvale, not about - - he's trying to use a
definition from another city to say that Mr. Haltom's store is a
sexually oriented business. I don't see how that's relevant.

After further discussion:
The Court:

Why is it improper argument?

Mr. Fahle:

Because it doesn't - - it's not relevant to this case what the
definition under some other ordinance is of an SOB. If it is, fine,
we've got plenty of ordinances that say as long as you have less than
15 percent of floor space.
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The District Court was correct in sustaining the objection. What other ordinances
contain is irrelevant to determining whether Midvale's ordinance is sufficiently clear. The
District Court determined that the language was not vague, and that the sale of novelty items
was the principal purpose of the business, stating "The Court notes that during the time of
trial, the defense insisted that the sexually oriented products were only an "incidental" part
of the business. The court finds the opposite to be true, particularly when one considers the
extremely high (80%) profit margin associated with these products." Memorandum Decision
page 9 (R. 918). The court stated further, "Additionally, the testimony at trial was clear that
over three-fourths of the profits at Dr. John's were generated by several "novelty products."
Id. at 10 (R. 919).
Further, as noted by the District Court, Dr. John's holds itself out as being an SOB.
The District Court stated,
Dr. John's clearly held itself out as a sexually oriented business,
starting with the large provocative sign (depicting a partially
clad female in a provocative pose) in front of the store . . . The

The Court:

I'm going to sustain the objection. We're not talking about Omaha
or Missouri or Texas, we're talking about the same county, in
essence, but I'm going to just delete this as an issue, counsel. I think

Mr. Hathaway:

The Court:

Well, that's fine your honor, as long as the defendant himself,
then, will be precluded from saying, "We've met somehow
the floor space requirement that fit within--"

No, I'm not going to allow that.
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store advertised in an adult magazine. The magazine adds
referenced "marital aids and adult videos" combined with a
picture of a female in a similar partially clad, provocative pose."
Memorandum Decision, page 9 (R. 918). When considering the amount, variety, and
character of the novelty items displayed in its store, in conjunction with the advertising
mentioned above, it is appropriate to determine, as the District Court did, that 'The
defendants should have been aware that their conduct fell within the scope of the ordinance."
Id.
It was the testimony of Mr. John A. Coil, Chief Financial Officer of Doctor John's,
that the principal purpose of coming into Utah was to fill the sex novelty market, with the
term novelty being a term of art in the industry that pertains to marital aids, etc. See
generally Trial Transcript Volume I, page 173, lines 21-25, page 174, lines 1-25, page 175,
lines 1-14. He had read an article about the potential appointment of a Utah Porn Czar and
felt like this was a community that was provincial and had far too long been repressed
sexually. Id. After reading the article he decided Utah would be a prime place to open up
one of his novelty businesses. His testimony was as follows:
Q. And you understood that to mean that there were a large
number of sexually repressed people in the State of Utah that
were inviting you to provide services and the product that's sold
in Doctor John's, Inc., correct?
A. That would be a fair restatement, as I recall
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Id. at 174-75. The court below took special note of the boldness of Mr. Coil's statement in
determining that there was no question Dr. John's principal purpose was to sell novelty
items, or sexually oriented products. See Memorandum Decision, page 10 (R. 919).
In order to avoid technical manipulations by SOB operators, Midvale city has drafted
a flexible ordinance with reasonable breadth. Perhaps the Court said it best at the hearing
on Plaintiffs second application for a temporary restraining order:
In this case I cannot find that there is anything inappropriate
about the ordinance, nor is there anything over broad or vague
about the same. The language in 5.56 is language that would be
commonly understood by a reasonable thinking person. It is not
complex language. It is not language that is -1 guess what you
would call legalese. It is simple, understandable, everyday
words. "Principal purpose," "sexually oriented." Those are
words that anyone would understand and I so find.
November 21, 2000 Hearing Transcript, attached hereto as Addendum "F", at 3. The
principal purpose language protects the city from SOB operators like Dr. John's who could
carry on an SOB under the guise that it's not its "main" or "sole" purpose. The principal
purpose language is flexible and allows the city to determine that a store can have one or
more primary purposes. This avoids the technical manipulation of SOB operators who do
not want to be subject to the ordinance.
Therefore, this court should uphold the District Court's conclusion that the language
"principal purpose" is not vague. The language is clear to a man of common intelligence.
The language is written so that it can be reasonably flexible to avoid abuses by business
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owners. There was an administrative process available to Dr. John's that it never took
advantage of. The facts show that the principal purpose of Dr. John's was to sell novelty
items, and that Dr. John's items were at the "hard core" of the definition where no vagueness
can be claimed. The court should therefore uphold the Midvale ordinance as constitutional.
V.

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN DETERMINING THAT
MIDVALE'S ORDINANCE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A PRIOR
RESTRAINT ON PROTECTED SPEECH
A,

The District Court was correct in holding that the doctrine of prior
restraint does not apply to the facts at hand

Prior restraint only arises where the content of expression is subject to censorship. See
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (where a statute allowing the
closure of a newspaper as a public nuisance if it proved to print malicious and slanderous
materials was deemed a prior restraint because it tried to censor the expression prior to its
being printed rather than punish it after the fact); see also O 'Connor v. City and County of
Denver, 894 F.2d 1210, 1220 (10th Cir. 1990), ("Governmental action constitutes a prior
restraint when it is directed to suppressing speech because of its content before the speech
is communicated.").
Here, Midvale's SOB ordinance does not ban the sale of sexually oriented items or
grant officials the discretion to suppress speech based on its content. Rather, it simply
requires SOB owners to obtain an SOB license before commencing their operation. The
District Court's treatment of this doctrine is especially persuasive:
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For the same reasons, the Court concludes that the prior
restraints doctrine is simply not applicable in this case because
the defendants' inability for operation of a sexually oriented
business is strictly due to the defendant's failure to apply for a
sexually oriented business license. The defendants' inability to
operate such a business has nothing to do with the content of
any protected speech which may be marginally attributable to
the sexually oriented products that they were selling. In other
words, there was no censorship involved.
Moreover, as pointed out by Justice White in his dissenting
opinion in FW/PBS, 439 U.S. at 244-45, the prior restraint
analysis does not apply where the ordinance was designed to
prevent secondary effects and not the dissemination of ideas or
expression. In discussing the Dallas ordinance in that case,
Justice White noted that ". . .the ordinance is in no way aimed
at regulating what may be sold or offered in the covered
business. With a license, operators can sell anything but obscene
publications. Without one - without satisfying the licensing
requirements - they can sell nothing because the city is justified
in enforcing the ordinance to avoid the likely unfavorable
consequences attending unregulated sexually oriented
businesses." Id. The prior restraint doctrine is inapplicable in
this case for the same reasons; the ordinance in question is
aimed at preventing secondary effect rather than the
dissemination of expression.
Memorandum Decision, page 6-8 (R. 915-917).
The facts at bar are similar to those dealt with by the Utah Supreme Court in Ogden
City v. Eagle Books, Inc. 586 P.2d 436 (Utah 1978). In that case, the city of Ogden appealed
from a summary judgement that denied injunctive relief prohibiting Eagle Books from
operating a bookstore without a business license. See id. at 436. Eagle Books had
successfully persuaded the District Court that any enjoinder of its business, although not
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properly licensed to do business, would constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint on its
right to free speech. See id. at 437.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court flatly rejected Eagle Book's argument and
reversed the District Court s's decision. It held that "[t]he doctrine of 'prior restraint' has
no application to the facts of this case" because "Ogden City has lawfully invoked the
sanction of license revocation." Id. The Court stated that:
Once the license has been properly revoked and a business
nevertheless continues to operate, the usual remedy is a
misdemeanor prosecution. What Ogden City seeks here is an
injunction. Such an action lies, not only against these
defendants, but against anyone else operating a business in
Ogden City without a license.
Id. In other words, the Court believed that a city's enforcement of its licensing ordinances,
when applied uniformly, could not be curtailed by the doctrine of prior restraint.
Here, as in Eagle Books, Midvale City is simply enforcing the provisions of its
licensing ordinance. The District Court was correct in determining that the case at bar
involves a licensing issue as opposed to a censorship issue. Midvale's ordinance does not
censor the sale of products in any way. The city would not object to Defendant's sale of
sexually oriented products if they simply applied for and received a sexually oriented
business license, something Defendants have yet to do. Therefore, the doctrine of prior
restraint has no application to this case.
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B.

Even if the doctrine of prior restraint did apply to the case at bar,
Midvale's ordinance would still not violate the doctrine

Dr. John's argues in point one and point six of its brief that the Midvale ordinance
constitutes a prior restraint on speech for the following reasons: 1) it leaves discretion in the
hands of one person to decide how to interpret the ordinance; 2) the ordinance fails to
provide for prompt judicial review of license denial; and 3) it does not leave adequate
alternative avenues of communication open. Even if the doctrine of prior restraint applied,
these arguments would still not render Midvale's SOB ordinance unconstitutional.
United States Supreme Court cases, " . . . addressing prior restraint have identified
two evils that will not be tolerated in such schemes." FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215,
225 (1990). First, "a scheme that places unbridled discretion in the hands of a government
official or agency constitutes a prior restraint and may result in censorship." Id. at 225-26
(quoting Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757 (1988)). Second,
"prior restraint that fails to place limits on the time within which the decision-maker must
issue the license is impermissible." Id. at 226.
1.

Midvale's SOB ordinance does not give one single official
unbridled discretion

Midvale's SOB ordinance does not give a single official unbridled discretion to
determine whether a business is required to obtain an SOB license. The responsibility of
determining whether an individual needs an SOB license is placed in the hands of "business
license officials." See M.C.C. § 5.56.130. However, their decisions are not final. "If the
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license is denied or approved with qualifications, or if a notice of suspension, revocation or
citation of a civil fine is imposed, the applicant or licensee may file an appeal with the
business license administrator." Id. at § 5.56.360(A). After an evidentiary hearing, the
business license administrator renders findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a
recommended decision to the City Administrator. See id. at § 5.56.360(E). Applicants then
have seven days to file any objections to the business license administrator's decision, after
which the City Administrator may accept or reject the recommendation. See id. at §
5.56.360(G). The statute creates three levels of review before a license can be denied. The
ordinance is clear that no one official has unbridled discretion.
Dr. John's cites Nichols v. Village ofPelham Manor, 91A F.Supp. 243 (S.D.N.Y.)
as support for its claim that the ordinance vests unbridled discretion in the hands of one
individual. The case is clearly distinguishable. In Nichols an ordinance that allowed the
Chief of Police to grant or deny licenses was stricken down as unconstitutional for failure
to have an appeals process. The Chief of Police was given sole discretion to decide what
was necessary to preserve "good order" and avoid "annoyance." Unlike that ordinance,
Midvale's ordinance contains explicit language that gives meaningful guidance to the license
administrator, and places the interpretation on the business license officials, as well as
business license administrator and city administrator. See generally M.C.C. § 5.56.130.
Unlike Nichols, Midvale's ordinance provides for prompt appeal and review of a license
denial. The power to interpret the statute does not lie strictly with one person. This, coupled
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with the fact that Midvale's ordinance gives meaningful standards that the District Court felt
were "plain language that anyone would understand" distinguishes the facts before this court
from those in the Nichols case.
Midvale's ordinance does not grant unbridled discretion to one authority, and is
therefore constitutional and should be upheld.
2.

Midvale's SOB ordinance provides for prompt judicial review of
a license denial

In FW/PBS the Supreme Court stated that a "scheme that fails to set reasonable time
limits on the decisionmaker creates the risk of indefinitely suppressing permissible speech"
and is therefore unconstitutional. 493 U.S. 226. In FW/PBS the court struck down an
ordinance that allowed 30 days for a chief of police to approve the issuance of a license, but
did not provide for any restriction on when the necessary health, fire, and building
department inspections needed to take place. See generally id. The ordinance would
therefore allow a city to postpone the granting of a license indefinitely by simply not sending
the fire department out to inspect the premises. This was held unconstitutional.
Midvale's ordinance deals with this problem by placing reasonable time restrictions
on both the inspecting agencies as well as the city administrators. Upon receipt of an
application, Midvale is required to determine whether the application is incomplete and
whether additional

information is necessary within seven days.

See M.C.C.

§ 5.56.130(E)(1). Once an application is deemed to be complete, the city has up to forty-five
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days to complete its inspections and approve or deny the license. See id. at § 5.56.130(E).
If a reviewing agency does not disapprove of the premises to be used for the business within
thirty days, or after obtaining a fifteen day extension period, the premises shall be deemed
approved by the reviewing agency. See id.
If an ordinance includes reasonable time limits wherein a licensing authority must act,
the ordinance passes constitutional muster. See Redner v. Dean, 29 F.3d 1495, 1500 (11th
Cir. 1994) ( forty-five day period for administrator's decision to grant or deny license valid
not unreasonable); TK's Video, Inc. v. Denton County, Tex., 830 F.Supp. 335, 345-47 (E.D.
Tex. 1993) (sixty-day time period for review of licensing application for adult bookstore
valid); ChesapeakeB & M, Inc. v. Harford County, Md, 831 F.Supp. 1241, 1249-1250 (D.
Md. 1993) (forty-four day time period for review of adult bookstore licensing application
not unreasonable); Wolff v. City of Monticello, 803 F.Supp. 1568, 1574 (D.Minn. 1992)
(ninety-day time period for decision on adult bookstore license application not
unreasonable); City of Colorado Springs v. Baby Dolls, 896 P.2d 272, 282 (Col. 1995)
(forty-day period for decision to grant or deny SOB ordinance viewed as not unreasonable).
These cases support a finding that forty-five days is a reasonable time period to grant
or deny a license. Therefore, Midvale's ordinance passes constitutional muster and should
be upheld.
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C.

Dr. John's argument that the ordinance fails to leave open adequate
alternative avenues of communication reads into the ordinance a zoning
restriction that does not exist

The doctrine that a city must leave open "adequate alternative avenues of
communication" when passing SOB ordinances argued in point five of Dr. John's brief is
inapplicable to the case at bar. Dr. John's attempt to apply this doctrine to the Midvale
ordinance tortures legal reasoning.
Dr. John's argues that a city must leave some properly zoned areas wherein SOB's
may locate. It argues further that since Midvale's SOB ordinance does not contain any
zoning restrictions, it is fair to read into that absence the conclusion that there must be
nowhere that a SOB can locate. Dr. John's states, "On its face, this ordinance creates an
impossible situation: a business must be located in a properly zoned place; and there are no
properly zoned places . . . Defendants are left not knowing whether it is even possible to
obtain the kind of license that must be obtained." Brief of Appellant at 39.
To the contrary, common sense dictates that the absence of zoning restrictions means
there are no restrictions on where an SOB can locate. In Renton (cited as support by Dr.
John's), the SOB ordinance included zoning restrictions stating no SOB could locate within
1000 feet of a church or school. The court held that it is not permissible for a city to restrict
zoning to the extent that there would be nowhere that an SOB could locate. 475 U.S. at 931.
Midvale specifically removed itself from the Renton "adequate alternative avenues"
analysis by excluding any zoning language in its ordinance. The Midvale ordinance places
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no restrictions on where an SOB may locate or how many SOB's may locate together. Dr.
John's refuses to accept the fact that the only thing hindering it from operating a sexually
oriented business in Midvale is simply applying for an SOB license. Midvale's ordinance
would allow it to establish twenty-five SOB's all in a row if it would only apply.
Dr. John's claim that it does not know if it is even possible to obtain an SOB license
due to zoning restrictions ignores the fact that it never even applied to get one. Arguing that
the absence of a zoning restriction somehow equates into a zoning ban on establishing an
SOB is illogical and should not be entertained by this court as grounds upon which the
Midvale ordinance could be stricken down.
VI.

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IS AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR BUSINESSES
OPERATING WITHOUT A LICENSE
In Ogden City v. Eagle Books, Inc. 586 P.2d 436 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme

Court established that injunctive relief is appropriate where a business is operating without
a valid license. In Ogden City, the city of Ogden appealed from a summary judgement that
denied injunctive relief prohibiting Eagle Books from operating a bookstore without a
business license. See id. at 436. Eagle Books had successfully persuaded the District Court
that any enjoinder of its business, although not properly licensed to do business, would
constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint on its right to free speech. See id. at 437.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court flatly rejected Eagle Book's argument and
reversed the District Court's decision. See id. It held that "[t]he doctrine of 'prior restraint'
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has no application to the facts of this case" because "Ogden City has lawfully invoked the
sanction of license revocation." Id. The Court Stated that:
Once the license has been properly revoked and a business
nevertheless continues to operate, the usual remedy is a
misdemeanor prosecution. What Ogden City seeks here is an
injunction. Such an action lies, not only against these
defendants, but against anyone else operating a business in
Ogden City without a license.
Id. This clearly establishes that an injunction is appropriate remedy that was correctly
granted by the court.
Here, as in Eagle Books, Midvale City is simply enforcing the provisions of its
licensing ordinance which allows the issuance of injunctive relief against the individuals
who operate sexually oriented businesses without the appropriate license. In other words,
this case involves a licensing issue as opposed to a censorship issue. The District Court was
correct in granting the injunction and its ruling should be upheld.
Further, Utah County v. Baxter, 635 P.2d 61 (Utah 1981) establishes that the violation
of a land-use restriction is enough to establish irreparable harm necessary to grant an
injunction. In Baxter, the district court had granted plaintiff Utah County an injunction
against defendant's commercial use of a single-family residence in violation of the county's
zoning ordinance. See id. at 62. Under the state zoning statute in effect at that time, both
injunctive and criminal prosecution were provided as alternate remedies for zoning
violations. See id. at 64. On appeal, the defendants argued that Utah County failed to show
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irreparable harm because there was an alternative remedy available at law, namely criminal
prosecution. See id. The Utah Supreme Court disagreed and stated that "enforcement
officers should be empowered to seek civil redress rather than proceed in every case by
criminal prosecution." Id.. The rationale was as follows:
An injunction should not be issued to prevent the commission
of a crime, if the only reason for preventing it is that it is a
crime. But, if the wrong complained of is injurious to property
interests or civil rights, or if it is a public nuisance, either in the
opinion of the court or in virtue of a statute or an ordinance
making it a nuisance, the fact that it is a violation of a criminal
statute or ordinance does not take away the authority of a court
of civil jurisdiction to prevent the injury or abate the nuisance.
Id. at 64. The Court continued by stating, "it may fairly be said that under the foregoing
analysis, a showing that the zoning ordinance had been violated is tantamount to a showing
of irreparable injury to the public." Id. at 65.
This Court's analysis in Baxter regarding irreparable harm is applicable to the present
case. Under Midvale City Code, the operation of a sexually oriented business without the
proper license constitutes a class B misdemeanor. feM.C.C. §5.56.370. Violators are also
subject to a suit for injunction. See M.C.C. § 5.56.330. As in Baxter, Midvale's licensing
officers "should be empowered to seek civil redress rather than proceed in every case by
criminal prosecution. See 635 P.2d at 64. Thus, "a showing that the [sexually oriented
business] ordinance has been violated is tantamount to a showing of irreparable injury to the
public."
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As established above, there is no question that Dr. John's has violated Midvale's SOB
ordinance. The District Court was therefore correct in determining that such a violation
would cause irreparable harm to Midvale City and that injunctive relief was an appropriate
remedy. The District Court's decision should be upheld.
VII.

THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY HAS NO APPLICATION TO THE
REQUIREMENT THAT A BUSINESS OBTAIN A VALID LICENSE
BEFORE OPERATING
Dr. John's argues that his customers have a right of privacy to buy sexually oriented

items and that this right somehow extends him the right to sell these items without a
legitimate business license. Dr. John's argument is incorrect for two reasons. First,
requiring that a business have a legitimate business license prior to operating has absolutely
nothing to do with the right of privacy. The right of privacy only extends to "those matters
deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" or which are "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty..." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,191-192(1986). There is no case
on the books that establishes that U.S. citizens have a fundamental right to use sexually
oriented products between themselves and that this privacy right extends to sexually oriented
businesses in such a way that it prohibits the city from requiring proper licensing to carry out
its business. Certainly such a right is not "deeply rooted" in our nation's history or "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty."
Second, all of the cases cited by Dr. John's to establish a right of privacy dealt with
statutes that criminalized conduct, banning the conduct outright. See generally Roe v. Wade,
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410 U.S. 113 (1973) (a Texas statute criminalizing the performance of abortions is stricken
down as unconstitutional); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (where a statute
criminalizing the use of contraceptive devices was declared a violation of the right of
privacy); and Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998) (where a statute criminalizing
consensual acts of sodomy within the privacy of the home was declared unconstitutional
under the Georgia constitution). All of these cases are distinct from the one at hand for a
very simple reason: the Midvale ordinance does not place a ban on any conduct. To the
contrary, it allows the sale of any sexual novelty item, requiring only that the seller obtain
an appropriate license. To be analogous to the statutes cited above, the Midvale ordinance
would have to criminalize the use, sale, or possession of sexual novelty items, which it
simply does not do.
Further, Dr. John's argues that in Griswold the court extended the right of privacy
to not only the marital couple using contraceptives in the bedroom, but also to the vendor
who wanted to sale the contraceptive devices. Dr. John's then argues that the holding of
Griswold establishes that those businesses that wanted to sell the birth control devices could
then do so without a legitimate business license, and that requiring Dr. John's to apply for
and receive an SOB license in order to sale sex toys is therefore a violation of privacy. This
is obviously not the holding of Griswold. The court in Griswold did not hold that the vendor
of birth control could function without a legitimate business license, and it did not hold that
the sale of sexually oriented items is protected by privacy.
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Simply put, requiring that a business have a business license has absolutely nothing
to do with any privacy right. The right of privacy does not trump the right of a city to
instigate licensing schemes that help to maintain order and control the negative secondary
effects of certain types of businesses. Dr. John's claim that it is cloaked in a right of privacy
that removes it from obtaining an appropriate business license is incorrect, not supported by
the cases it cites as authority, and should be rejected by this court as it was rejected by the
District Court below.
VIII. APPELLANT'S STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS SHOULD BE
DISMISSED BECAUSE APPELLANT FAILS TO ADEQUATELY RAISE OR
BRIEF "DIFFERENT ANALYSIS" UPON WHICH A DECISION CAN BE
MADE
Dr. John's argues that they "may well have additional protections under the Utah
Constitution," urging the court to expand the protection of Article 1 Section 15 to grant more
protection to the sale of sexually oriented products than that required by the First
Amendment. Dr. John's argument fails on both procedural and substantive grounds.
First, this Court should not address the Utah Constitutional issues because "as a
general rule, we will not engage in state constitutional analysis unless an argument for
different analyses under the state and federal constitutions is briefed." State v. Lafferty, 749
P.2dl239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988). Justice Durham, in her dissent to State v. Davis, 912V 2d
388 (Utah 1998), stated, "This court's language in Lafferty was intended to discourage the
practice by some litigants of making federal constitutional arguments and then mentioning,

\\Joni\myfiles\UGT\Haltom\PLEADINGS\reply brief sup ct corbin wpd

57

as an afterthought, that the act in question "also" violates state constitutional law, without
further explanation." Id. at 394.
Dr. John's periphery treatment of its state constitutional claim does not set forth any
different analyses upon which this court could decide the case. It also does not meet the
requirements to brief its claims set out in Lafferty. The argument is included as an
afterthought at the end of a forty-four page brief, referring to only one state case, and two
unrelated cases in other jurisdictions.9 It does not analyze the contours of state constitutional
law nor the historical background of the constitutional language as required by West v.
Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994), which is cited as support for Dr. John's
claim.
In West this court discussed that it had been criticized for not developing an a
consistent approach for cases in which both state and federal constitutional claims are made.

9

Dr. John's citation to City of Portland v. Tidyman, 759 P.2d 242 (Or. 1988) as
support for its claim is misplaced. As cited by Dr. John's in West, e.g., the Utah
Supreme Court only looks to sibling states construing similar constitutional provisions.
Id. at 1013. Further, West recognized that only cases from states that have identical
language is viewed for guidance in determining the meaning of Article 1 Section 15. See
generally id. at 1016. Oregon's constitutional language protects the right to "speak,
write, or print freely on any subject whatsoever." This is not a similar constitutional
provision to Utah's Article I Section 15. Dr. John's concedes as much stating Oregon's
constitutional language is "arguably a bit broader than our own Constitution." Further,
Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998) was not decided on the basis of free speech,
but on Georgia's constitutional provision protecting citizens from unreasonable search
and seizure. Id. at 22, n.2. Powell is therefore not based on similar constitutional
language and the legal analysis of the case is entirely inapplicable to the case at bar.
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Id. at 1005. In response to this criticism, the court discussed four alternative theories for
dealing with the problem and chose to apply the primacy approach to the analysis of a
Article I Section 15 claim that dealt with defamation. In the primacy approach "a state court
looks first to state constitutional law, develops independent doctrine and precedent, and
decides federal questions only when state law is not dispositive." Id. at 1007.
In West, this Court was faced with determining if the state constitution protected
expressions of opinion in newspaper editorials from defamation actions.

The court

considered extensive state case law, the text of the constitutional language, and a thorough
historical analysis of the intent of the Constitutional drafters. See generally id. at 1007-1020.
The court determined that due to the historical fighting between the two main newspapers
of the day, as well as comments made during debates surrounding Article I Section 15, that
it was the intent of the drafters to have a free and uninhibited press. The court therefore
determined that defamation claims based on opinions written in editorials are not actionable.
As demonstrated in West, the information necessary to determine whether the Utah
Constitution ought to grant more protection than the First Amendment is extensive, if not
exhaustive. It requires more than simply claiming as an afterthought that the court extended
the protection in a different context and should do so again, without setting forth any
"different analysis" whereon the court could decide the case under the state claim. See State
v. Vigil 922 P.2d 15, 28 (Utah.Ct.App.1996) ("It is well established that this court will
decline to consider an argument that a party has failed to adequately brief."); see also State
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v. Scott, 860 P.2d 1005,1007 n. 3 (Utah.Ct.App. 1993) (declining to address defendant's state
constitutional argument for lack of adequate briefing).
Dr. John's has not done the work necessary to present a state constitutional claim to
the court. If a decision were to be made based on state constitutional grounds it would be
up to the court to do all of the heavy lifting of the research and analysis necessary to justify
such a decision. Lafferty places the burden of raising and briefing different analytical claims
squarely on the back of the proponent of the claim, wisely refusing to allow litigants to raise
bald claims and then require that the court find justification for them. The District Court was
therefore correct in not even addressing the state constitutional claims. This court should
uphold the District Court and likewise decide the issues based only on federal law.
Finally, Dr. John's argument that the Utah Constitution should be extended to grant
more protection to the sale of sexually oriented products than required by the First
Amendment is not in keeping with the state's jurisprudence, history, or best interests. As
mentioned above, the only area wherein the State's free speech protection has been extended
beyond that required by federal law is in the area of defamation, and more specifically in the
area of speech expressed during heated and lively political battles. This extension is
necessary in protecting speech that is "core" to the concept and purpose of free speech and
its place in a democratic environment.
It would be unwise for this court to extend heightened protection for this type of
expression, especially when it has been universally recognized that the existence of
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businesses that deal in these wares cause deleterious secondary effects that can blight
communities, cause the spread of disease, and create significant increases in crime. By
extending heightened protection under Utah law this court would further restrict a city's
"reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems."
Renton, 475 U.S. at 931.
Therefore, due to a failure to adequately raise and brief different state constitutional
claims, as well as the fact that no case law or historical analysis can support an argument that
heightened protection ought to be granted to the sale of sexually oriented items under the
Utah Constitution, this court should uphold the District Court's decision and base the
grounds of its ruling solely on Federal law.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, the ruling of the District Court that Midvale's SOB
ordinance is a constitutionally valid content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation
should be upheld. The District Court's injunction should therefore remain in place.
DATED this 1 ? ^ l a y of April, 2002.

PETER STIRBA
BENSON L. HATHAWAY
CORBIN B. GORDON
Attorneys for Appellee
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ADDENDUM
August 16, 2000 amendments to Chapter 5.56 of the Midvale City Code.
Cited portions of the Trial Transcript.
Dr. John's Business License Application dated 6/14/00.
Letter from Susan Shreeve to John Haltom dated 6/28/00.
Dr. John's General Business License dated 8/08/00.
November 21, 2000 Hearing Transcript

ADDENDUM A

ORDINANCE 08/16/2000
An Ordinance amending Chapter 5.56 of the Midvale City Code concerning
Sexually Oriented Businesses by adding Section 5.56,000 and amending Sections
5.56.130 and 5.56.360.
WHEREAS, The City Council finds that additional administrative changes not
included in the November 1999 amendment to this section are needed to further update
this section; and
WHEREAS, sexually oriented businesses require special supervision from the
public safety agencies of the City in order to protect and preserve the health, safety,
morals and welfare of the patrons of such businesses as well as the citizens of the City;
and
WHEREAS, licensing is a legitimate and reasonable means of accountability to
ensure that operators of sexually oriented businesses comply with reasonable regulations
and to ensure that operators do not knowingly allow their establishments to be used as
places of illegal sexual activity or solicitations; and
WHEREAS, there is convincing documented evidence that sexually oriented
businesses, because of their very nature, have a deleterious effect on both the existing
businesses around them and the surrounding residential areas adjacent to them, causing
increased crime and the downgrading of property values; and
WHEREAS, the City Council desires to minimize and control these adverse
effects and thereby protect the health, safety, and welfare of the citizenry; protect the
citizens from increased crime; preserve the quality of life; preserve the property values
and character of surrounding neighborhoods and deter the spread of urban blight; and
WHEREAS, it is not the intent of this amendment to supress any speech
activities protected by the First amendment; and
WHEREAS, the City Council finds that it is in the best interest of the citizens to
amend the ordinance.
NOW THEREFORE, be it ordained by the City as follows:
Section 5.56.000 entitled "Purpose of Section" is added as follows:
5.56.000 Purpose of Section. It is the purpose and object of this section
that the City establish reasonable and uniform regulations governing the time, place and
manner of operation of sexually oriented businesses and their employees in the City.
This Section shall be construed consistent with the governmental interests of the City in
protecting its citizens from increased crime in the preservation of its quality of life and
property values and the character of the City's neighborhoods and businesses: and to deter
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the spread of urban blight and to protect against the spread of sexually transmitted
diseases.

Section 5.56.130 is amended as follows:
5.56.130 License-Issuance Conditions. The City business license official shall approve
the issuance of a license to the applicant within thirty (30) days after receipt of any
application, unless the official finds one or more of the following:
A.

The applicant is under eighteen (18) years of age or any higher age, if the
license sought requires a higher age;

B.

The applicant is overdue in payment to the City of taxes, fees, fines or
penalties assessed against the applicant or imposed on the applicant in
relation to a sexually oriented business;

C

The applicant has falsely answered a material question or request for
information as authorized by this chapter:

D.

The applicant has been convicted of a violations of a provision of this
chapter within two years immediately preceding the application; however,
the fact that a conviction is being appealed shall have no effect on the
denial;

E.

The premises to be used for the business have been disapproved by the
Salt lake County Health Department, the City Fire Department, the City
Police Department, the City building officials or the City zoning officials
as being not in compliance with applicable laws and ordinances of the
City. If any of the foregoing reviewing agencies cannot complete their
review within the thirty (30) day approval or denial period, the agency or
department may obtain from the City business license official an extension
of time for their review of no more than fifteen (15) days. The total time
for the City to approve or deny a license shall not exceed forty-five (45)
days from the receipt of the application. If a reviewing agency does not
disapprove of the premises to be used for the business within 30 days, or
after obtaining a 15 day extension from the City business license official,
does not disapprove the premises within the 15 day extension period, the
premises shall be deemed approved by the reviewing agency. Businesses
located outside of the corporate boundaries of the City, but requiring a
license under this chapter, may be denied a license pursuant to this chapter
if the business does not have a valid business license to conduct business
at the business location;
1.

Upon receipt of an application, all departments required to
review the applications shall determine within 7 days.
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whether or not the application is incomplete in items
needed for processing. Incomplete applications shall
immediately be returned to the applicant with a
specification of the item (s) which are incomplete.
2.

F.
G.
H.
I.

The time for processing applications specified in this
section shall begin to run from the receipt of a completed
application.

The license fees required by this chapter or by other ordinances have not
been paid;
All applicable sales and use taxes have not been paid;
An applicant for the proposed business is in violation of or not in
compliance with this chapter;
An applicant has been convicted or pled nolo contendre to a crime:
1.

2.

Involving prostitution; exploitation of prostitution;
aggravated promotion of prostitution; aggravated
exploitation of prostitution, solicitation of sex acts; sex
acts for hire; compelling prostitution; aiding prostitution;
sale, distribution or display of material harmful to minors;
sexual performance by minors; possession of/or distribution
of pornography: possession of or distribution of child
pornography; public lewdness; indecent exposure; any
crime involving sexually abuse or exploitation of a child;
sexually assault; or aggravated sexual assault; rape; forcible
sodomy, forcible sexual abuse, incest; harboring a runaway
child; criminal attempt, conspiracy or solicitation to
commit any of the foregoing offenses or offenses,
involving similar element elements from any jurisdictions
regardless of the exact title of the offense; for which:
a.

Less than two years have elapsed from the
date of conviction, if the conviction is a
misdemeanor offense, or less than five
years, if the convictions are of two or more
misdemeanors within the five years;

b.

Less that five years have elapsed from the
date of conviction, if the offense is a felony;

The fact that a conviction is being appealed shall have no
effect on the disqualification pursuant to this section.

3
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Section 5.56.360 is amended to read:
5.56.360 Appeals
A.

If the license is denied or approved with qualifications, or if a
notice of suspension, revocation or citation of a civil fine is
imposed, the applicant or licensee may file an appeal with the
business license administrator.

B.

Filing of an appeal must be within ten (10) days of the date of
service of the notice of denial, qualified approval, suspension,
revocation of civil fine. Upon receiving the notice of such appeal,
the business license administrator shall schedule a hearing before
the hearing board within twenty (20) days from the date of the
appeal unless such time shall be extended for good cause.

C

The hearing board shall hold a public hearing on the record, and
take such facts and evidence as necessary to determine whether the
denial, qualified approval, suspension, revocation or civil fine was
proper under the law.

D.

The burden of proof shall be on the City.

E.

After the hearing, the license administrator shall have seven (7)
working days, unless extended for good cause, in which to render
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended decision to
the City Administrator.

F.

Either party may object to the recommendation of the hearing
board by filing the party's objections and reasons, in writing to the
City Administrator within seven (7) days following the
recommendation. In the event the hearing board recommends
upholding a suspension or revocation, the license shall be
immediately suspended, and shall remain suspended until any
subsequent appeal is decided. If no objections are received within
seven (7) days the City Administrator may immediately adopt the
recommendation of the hearing board.

G.

If objections are received, the City Administrator shall have ten
(10) working days to consider such objections before issuing the
City Administrator's final decision. The City Administrator may,
in the City Administrator's discretion take additional evidence or
require written memorandum on issues of fact or law. The
standard by which the City Administrator shall review the decision
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of the hearing board is whether substantial evidence exists on the
record to support the hearing board's recommendations.
This ordinance shall become effective immediately upon passage.
APPROVED AND ADOPTED this /6>f- day of Ctu^J-

, 2000.
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Christeen C. Pratt, City Recorder
Publication Date
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ADDENDUM B
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order and then also the products after and up until the

2

Court's—

3

THE COURT:

And I assume there's a dispute as to

4

whether the primary purpose language is applicable; is that

5

correct?

6

MR. FAHLE:

I'm sorry, your Honor, you said there is a

8

THE COURT:

That's what I said*

9

MR. FAHLE:

There is a subject dispute, yes.

7

10

dispute?

MR. HATHAWAY:

The last fact, your Honor, is "The

11

defendants have never submitted an application to Midvale City

12

for a sexually oriented business license."

13
14

THE COURT:

Yes, that's my understanding as well.

that true, Mr. Fahle?

15

MR. FAHLE:

16

MR. HATHAWAY:

17

THE COURT:

That's right, your Honor.
That's all I have.

All right, that's helpful, counsel.

18

me just get the present status update.

19

Is it operating without sexually —

20

materials?

21

the present status?

22

Is

Is the business closed?

arguably sexually explicit

Is it operating without those materials?

MR. HATHAWAY:

Let

What's

The present status, as I understand it,

23

is that it's operating, it's open and it is not presently

24

selling the kinds of items that have been identified in the

25

prior proceedings.
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2
3

THE COURT:
Q.

Thank you, Mr, Fahle.

BY MR. HATHAWAY:

Have you seen that document before,

Ms. Shreeves?

4

A.

Yes, I have.

5

Q.

What is it?

6

A.

It is an application for a business license for Doctor

7
8
9

John's located at 6885 South State.
Q.

I notice in the upper right-hand corner there is

handwritten "6/14/00," do you see that?

10

A.

Yes, that's the date we received it.

11

Q.

Do you remember receiving this document on or about

12
13

June 14th of 2000?
A.

Yes, I do.

14

MR. HATHAWAY:

15

THE COURT:

Any objection?

16

MR. FAHLE:

No, your Honor.

17

THE COURT:

It's received.

18

(Exhibit No. 2 received into evidence)

19
20

Q.

Your Honor, I'd offer Plaintiff's 2.

BY MR. HATHAWAY:

Did you review this document when

you received it?

21

A.

Yes, I did.

22

Q.

What did you observe when you received it?

23

A.

I observed that there was missing information, there

24

was no Utah State sales tax number.

There's a work listed but

25

there's no address listed as his home address.

The phone
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number was an out-of-state phone number, there was no date of

2

birth, the driver's license number was missing.

3

found out that his last name —

4

H-a-1-t-o-n, it was actually t-o-m.

5
6
7
8

Q.

I subsequently

it looked like it was spelled

When you received this and looked at it and made these

observations, what did you do?
A.

I contacted Mr. Haltom and requested the information

that was missing off the application.

9

Q.

Did he provide it for you?

10

A.

He provided me with a date of birth and he stated that

11

the driver's license number was (inaudible) just used a Social

12

Security number so he did not actually have a driver's license

13

number.

14

his home address was the business address.

15

Q.

I requested a home address from him and he stated that

After receiving this information from Mr. Haltom did

16

you have an occasion to go and inspect the property that he

17

proposed to open a business by?

18

A.

I did.

19

Q.

When did you do that?

20

A.

Approximately I believe it was within the next week.

21

Q.

When you inspected the premises, why don't you

22
23

describe for us what you saw,
A.

When I entered the store I saw that he was just barely

24

putting out his inventory.

He had a couple of pieces of

25

lingerie out, he had the picture book of sensual love making,
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Q.

Tell me about that,

2

A.

I told Mr. Haltom that according to what was out on

3

the shelves so far the city would require that he apply for a

4

sexually oriented business license unless he removed those

5

things from the shelves.

6
7

Q.

Can I have you take a look at Exhibit No. 9 in that

binder?

8

A.

Okay.

9

Q.

Have you seen that document before?

10

A.

Yes, I have, this is the letter I wrote Mr. Haltom.

11

Q.

What's the date of that letter?

12

A.

June 28th.

13

Q.

Does it bear your signature as the business license

14
15

administrator?
A.

Yes, it does.

16

MR. HATHAWAY:

17

THE COURT:

Any objection?

18

MR. FAHLE:

Just one second, your Honor.

19

THE COURT:

Okay, take your time.

20

MR. FAHLE:

No objection, your Honor.

21 I

THE COURT:

Nine is received.

22 |

(Exhibit No. 9 received into evidence)

23 I
24
25 I

Q.

BY MR. HATHAWAY:

Haltom?
A.

Your Honor, I'd offer Plaintiff's 9.

Yes, I did.

Did you mail that letter to Mr.
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had in mind and were applying when you received the business

2

license on June 14, 2000 from Mr. Haltom?

3

A.

Correct.

4

Q.

Is this the provision you had in mind when you

5

inspected his premises later in June?

6

A.

Yes, it was.

7

Q.

And this is the provision from the code which you

8

provided to Mr. Haltom under cover of your June 29th letter?

9

A.

Correct.

10

Q.

By the way, did you ever have a second occasion to

11

provide a copy of this ordinance to Mr. Haltom?

12

A.

I did.

13

Q.

When?

14

A.

He asked for it approximately a month later, and I

15

hand delivered another copy to him, and then his attorney,

16

Andrew McCullough, requested that the forms be sent to him.

17

sent the entire SOB ordinance, part of the manual, and I sent

18

all the requirements —

19

City requires for an SOB application.

20

card.

21
22

Q.
binder.

I

I sent a check list of what Midvale
I sent a fingerprint

Let me have you take a look at Exhibit No. 3 in that
Have you seen that document before?

23

A.

Yes, I have.

24

Q.

What is it?

25

A.

It is a check list that we provide for businesses that
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testified that you observed at the store?

2

A.

Yes, I did,

3

Q.

Did you have any discussions with Mr. Haltora at this

4

next visit?

5

A.

No, I did not.

6

Q.

Was he present?

7

A.

Yes, he was.

8

Q.

Did he say anything to you?

9

A.

Officer Seamons and I entered the store and he became

10

very irate.

11

that his business license was going to be suspended.

12

started —

13

needed to move back to Russia.

14

of the letter and we left the store.

15
16

Q.

We served him with a notice of my letter saying
He

he called us, "fucking communists," and said we
We had him sign the acceptance

I'll hand you what we've marked as Exhibit 82.

Have

you seen that before?

17

A.

Yes, I have.

18

Q.

What is it?

19

A.

It is a letter I wrote to Mr. Haltom stating that we

20

were going to suspend his business license, and that he had a

21

right to appeal —

22
23

Q.

to file an appeal if he so wished to do.

Is this the letter you referred to that you hand

delivered to hira?

24

A.

Yes, it is.

25

Q.

And you hand delivered it to him on what date?
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A.

No, I have not.

2

Q.

Take a look at Exhibit No. 1, please.

3

A.

Okay.

4

Q.

Have you seen that document before?

5

A.

No, I don't believe we have this in our business file.

6

Q.

Take a look at No. 6 for just a minute, if you would.

7

A.

Okay.

8

Q.

What's that?

9

A.

That was a rewrite of the sexually oriented business

10

section 5.56 of the Midvale City Code.

11

Q.

What's the date of that rewrite?

12

A.

August 16th.

13

Q.

Of which year?

14

A.

2000.

15

Q.

Can you be more precise as to which sections of 5.56

16

it amended?

17

A.

It amended Section 5.56.130 and 5.56.360.

18

Q.

Is it your understanding that this now is the part of

19

the Midvale City ordinance as it relates to the sexually

20

oriented business?

21

A,

Correct.

22

MR. HATHAWAY:

Your Honor, I would offer 6.

23

THE COURT:

Any objection?

24

MR. FAHLE:

One moment, your Honor.

25

THE COURT:

Take your time.
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(Counsel reviews exhibit)

2

MR. FAHLE:

3

well, no objection.

4

THE COURT:

5

(Exhibit No. 6 received into evidence)

6
7

Q.

No objection, your Honor.

Six is received.

BY MR. HATHAWAY:

Can I have you take a look at

Exhibit No. 25?

8

A.

Okay.

9

Q.

Before we get to that, let me back up.

10

I would note

Let me just

back up to Exhibit 81 again.

11

A.

I'm sorry, Exhibit 8 did you say?

12

Q.

Eighty-one.

13

A.

Okay.

14

Q.

Take a look at Section 5.02.020, it's on page 33.

It would be the Midvale City ordinance.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. HATHAWAY:

17
18

Q.

Did you say Exhibit 82 or 81?
Eighty-one.

BY MR. HATHAWAY:

It would be the fourth page back.

Do you see that?

19

A.

Yes, I do.

20

Q.

What does that provision do?

21

A.

This provision states that it's unlawful to operate a

22

business without first obtaining a business license.

23

Q.

What was the effective date of that section?

24

A.

September of 1998, it was rewritten.

25

Q.

Could you leaf over to Section 5.56.040?

—
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2

ask the first question.
Q.

BY MR. MCCULLOUGH:

Is that, in your mind, using the

3

same criteria you used when you went into my client's business,

4

a sexually oriented product?

5

A.

Probably, yes.

6

Q.

If you saw that on the shelves would you consider that

7

a violation of his business license?

8

MR. HATHAWAY:

9

THE COURT:

10

Same objection.

Overruled, you may answer.

THE WITNESS:

I think probably, given the other

11

products that were with it, I would say yes, it would be

12

sexually oriented.

13

shelf?

14

Q.

BY MR. MCCULLOUGH: Yes.

15

A.

No.

Would he be denied if he had this on the

I did not ask that his whips, chains, handcuffs

16

be removed, nor did I —

he had boobie cream and edible

17

condoms, and no, I didn't ask that any of that be removed.

18

Q.

All of that is okay?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

It is, in your mind, sexually oriented, but it isn't a

21
22

violation; is t h a t —
A.

Right.

23

THE COURT:

Edible what?

24

THE WITNESS:

25

MR, HATHAWAY:

Condoms.
I'd like to interpose an objection,
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2

A.

5
6
7
8

I was out so many times.

Most of

the times he was there.
THE COURT:

3
4

I'm sorry, I don't.

Can I get you to speak just a little

louder and right into the mike?
Q.

BY MR. HATHAWAY:

Go ahead, counsel.

When was the next occasion you

visited the premises?
A.

After September 13th I was out again with Susan

Shreeves on October 2nd.

9

Q.

To look at the inventory?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

What did you see?

12

A.

That he was well stocked with several sexually

13

oriented items, and I made a memo of this information for our

14

city attorney at this time.

15

Q.

Now you characterized this product as sexually

16

oriented product.

17

was you saw?

18

A.

Can you be more specific and tell us what it

There were several hundred dildos and/or vibrators in

19

the shape of penises at that time, other types of sexual

20

paraphernalia, as Susan made reference to also on this meeting.

21

There were anal beads and stuff like that.

22

Q.

Do you remember seeing the videos?

23

A.

There were videos, and at this time I don't recall how

24

many.

25

to look through the booklets you'd have to open the packaging

They were wrapped with the book that went with them, so
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to see what was in the booklets, but there were a couple of

2

videos and booklets.

3

Q.

Was Mr. Haltora present during this inspection?

4

A.

Yes, during this inspection he was there.

5

Q.

Did you have a conversation with him?

6

A.

We did speak, but Susan pretty much was the one that

7

did most of the speaking as far as him already being aware of

8

the ordinances and stuff.

9
10

Q.

Did you have an occasion to visit the premises after

this October 2nd visit you referred to?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

When was the next time?

13

A.

We were requested to go out on the 20th and get a more

14

accurate count of how many items, type of sexually oriented

15

items that were on the shelves and stuff.

16

Q.

Did you take a look at the inventory on the 20th?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

What did you see?

19

A.

That it had increased by several hundred items at that

20

time in the sexually oriented category.

21

other things in the clothing line.

22

THE COURT:

23

THE WITNESS:

He had also added some

I can barely hear you.
He had also added other items in the

24

clothing line, but our concern was more focused on the sexually

25

oriented items.
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THE WITNESS:

2

THE COURT:

Approximately 500.

Oh, 500.

Thank you.

3

Q.

BY MR. HATHAWAY:

And what else?

4

A.

There was approximately 2 0 female genitalia type

5

devices, finger vibrators, and then the other stuff like

6

pleasure rings, anal beads, other sexually oriented

7

paraphernalia.

8
9

Q.

On October 24th had the number increased or decreased

of these items that you identified in this memo?

10

A.

It had increased.

11

Q.

Would you read what you wrote on October 24, 2000?

12

A.

My notation says, "About 300 more and different items

13

have been added.

14

devices for men."

15
16

Q.

Approximately 200 more dildos and 100 more

Did you go out again and inspect the premises where

Mr. Haltora operates his business?

17

A.

After October 24th, yes, I did.

18

Q.

When?

19

A.

On November 7th Susan and I went out again at about 3

20

in the afternoon.

21

Q.

Had there been any change in his inventory?

22

A.

No, relatively no different change, everything was

23
24
25

still there.
Q.

And since November 7th —

present on November 7th?

by the way, was Mr. Haltom
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not sure I understood the question, and maybe that's what's

2

troubling Mr. Coil.

3

Q.

BY MR. HATHAWAY:

The stores that are owned by Rex

4

Temple are in the business of selling lingerie and adult

5

novelties, correct?

6

A.

Rex Temple owns a store or two —

or a number of

7

stores, and I didn't count the number or make a list, and I

8

wouldn' t say 17, but it could be 17.

9

stores that are owned by Rex Temple, Incorporated that sell

10

lingerie.

11

Q.

There are some lingerie

They are lingerie stores.
In your position with Rex Temple and also with Doctor

12

John's, Inc. and the service that you provide, you know who the

13

officers and directors of the various corporations are,

14 i correct-?
15

A.

Yes, I do.

16

Q.

In fact, Mr. Haltom owns 50 percent of the Utah Doctor

17

John's, Inc., true?

18

A.

That's correct.

19

Q.

And he sits on the board of directors , correct?

20

A.

That's correct.

21

Q.

It's true, is it not, Mr. Co il, that the reason Doctor

22

John's, Inc. incorporated in Utah and opened a Midvale store

23

was in response to the invitation of the State of Utah to open

24

that store, correct?

25

A.

It's a humorous way to make a point, but indirectly,

1
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the State of Utah let out stories that said that there was an

2

insufficient satisfying of the market in Salt Lake City. I

3

said that clumsily, and I apologize.

4
5
6

Q.

And the story you're referring to is an article that

you read in the Los Angeles papers, correct?
A.

I read an article in the Los Angeles Times, I believe,

7

that said that Utah had appointed or was going to appoint a

8

porn czar.

9

Q.

And you understood that to mean that there were a

10

large number of sexually repressed people in the State of Utah

11

that were inviting you to provide services and the product

12

that's sold in Doctor John's, Inc., correct?

13

A.

That would be a fair restatement, as I recall.

14

Q.

By that, you're not just referring to lingerie, are

15
16
17
18

you, Mr. Coil?
A.

I'm referring to a state — I was referring to a state

of mind that I anticipated the people of Utah might have.
Q.

And that state of mind was satisfied, was it not, Mr.

19

Coil, only by the sale of lingerie, as well as by the sale of

20

adult novelties and adult videos, correct?

21

A.

I am not a sociologist.

It was an off-the-cuff kind

22

of thing, and I apologize to the people of Utah if I in any way

23

insulted them or grouped them as a group and say that they're

24

provincial.

25

Q.

But that's the reason why, isn't is, Mr. Coil, that
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2

you decided to open Doctor John's in Midvale, correct?
A-

I believe that repressed people, when they find

3

freedom, whether they're Russian or Spanish, as has recently

4

happened, that market opportunities exist. People in the

5

United States, there is certainly a holding up to the people in

6

Utah to —

7

feel like the people in Utah are provincial.

8
9
10
11
12

Q.

I'll try to choose the right word, but some people

And that is why, is it not, Mr. Coil, that you decided

to open Doctor John's, Inc. in Midvale, Utah to meet the needs
of those repressed people, true?
A.

That would be a fair restatement of what you're

saying.

13

Q.

Is is true or is it false?

14

A.

I would say it's true.

15

Q.

It's true, is it not, that had you not read the

16

article about the porn czar you never would have opened up a

17

store in Utah to sell lingerie, adult novelties and adult

18

videos.

19

A.

That's a fair statement.

20

Q.

It's also true, is it not, Mr. Coil, that when you

21

sell the novelties —

and specifically I'm talking about adult

22

videos, dildos, pocket pussies, sexual aids, your profit margin

23

is along the lines of 80 percent.

24

A.

I feel like that that's an accurate statement.

25

Q.

In fact, you buy the videos that you sell for three
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1
2

(Electronically recorded on May 30, 2001)

3

THE COURT:

(Court already in session when recorder

4

was turned on) City of Midvale vs. Doctor John's, John Haltom.

5

Are we ready to go forward?

6

MR. FAHLE:

Yes, your Honor.

7

THE COURT:

All right, you may call your next witness.

8

MR. FAHLE:

I call John Haltom.

9

THE COURT:

Mr. Haltom, I think you were sworn in

10

yesterday—

11

MR. FAHLE:

Yes, your Honor.

12

THE COURT:

And you're still under oath.

13
14
15
16

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. FAHLE:
Q.

Mr. Haltom , let me ask you, you have —

you, I guess,

are the manager at the store at issue in this case?

17

A.

Yes, that' s correct.

18

Q.

How many other Doctor John stores have you owned and

19

(inaudible).

20

A.

Approximately nine.

21

Q.

Nine?

22

A.

Uh-huh.

23

Q.

Where are those stores?

24

A.

St. Louis, Omaha, Midvale.

25

Q.

What happened to the stores in St. Louis?

-3471

that it was the Court's recollection there was an agreement.

2

Surely the temporary restraining order speaks for itself, and

3

Ms. Shreeves testified that she understood there was an

4

agreement, and in fact, the city issued a business license,

5

understanding that in exchange for that license the applicant

6

would withdraw articles or product that was a problem.

7

It wasn't more than a couple of weeks, though, your

8

Honor, until mid to late October when the product appeared

9

anew, appeared again. A subsequent application for a

10

restraining order followed, it was issued, and it was only that

11

order that ultimately precluded sale by the defendant of the

12

product that's been in question from the outset.

13

Notably along the way, your Honor, and there were

14

really two points when this could have occurred, initially when

15

Mr. Haltom and his business was informed that he needed to get

16

a sexually oriented business license, the ordinance allowed him

17

to appeal, to appeal to the license administrator who would

18

convene a panel to consider the concerns and make a decision.

19

That appeal was not pursued.

20

That's important, your Honor.

Later after the first restraining order, after non-

21

compliance when the city finally threatened to and in fact

22

suspended temporarily the business license, there was a request

23

for an appeal, but it shifted, really, to the trial court and

24

nothing was ever pursued.

25

The reason that's important, your Honor, is because

-3511

prohibit the sale, but simply —

2

Estates decision, it quotes, "simply regulates the commercial

3

marketing of items that the labels reveal may be used for an

4

illicit purpose," close quote.

5

I'm quoting again the Hoffman

Well, in this case, your Honor, again, the ordinance

6

of Midvale seeks to regulate marketing of items which are

7

displayed and designed to be used for a certain defined sexual

8

purposes.

9

therefore, doesn't embrace any sort of protected non-commercial

Like in Hoffman Estates, the ordinance here,

10

speech.

If anything, it addresses the secondary effects of the

11

sale of the product that's defined in the ordinance.

12

Now remember what Mr. Coil said.

It was sort of

13

unsolicited and sort of unanticipated, but what he said was,

14

"Our purpose in buying this stuff is to sell it, and when it

15

goes out the door we could care less, it's irrelevant.

16

bring it in, we sell it, end of purpose."

17

untrammeled political debate going on.

18

message being communicated.

19

Honor.

20

is commercial speech.

21

product.

22

debate, there's nothing else.

23

it's sold.

24
25

We

There's no

There's no erotic

There is no communication, your

At the very most, from the defendant's point of view,
They bring a product in, they sell the

There's no displaying, there's no dancing, there's no
It's a product that comes in and

Consequently, it's really irrelevant, and this is sort
of a footnote, but it's important, and this is again the

-3691

MR. HATHAWAY:

5.61,040 is the provision that defines

2

the sexually oriented business, and it says, "An adult

3

bookstore or an adult video store means a commercial

4

establishment A) which excludes minors from more than 15

5

percent of the retail floor or shelf space of the premises."

6

It doesn't talk about the square footage on which the material

7

is stocked, it's the percentage of square footage from which

8

minors are excluded.

9

Mr. Haltom was asked on the stand, "In fact, Mr.

10

Haltom, you exclude the minors from your premises entirely,

11

correct?"

"Yes—"

12

MR. FAHLE:

Judge, I have to —

13

MR. HATHAWAY:

14

THE COURT:

Just one moment.

15

MR. FAHLE:

I have to object to this, given this

— " w e card anyone under—"

16

Court's consistent throughout this trial, this'Court's

17

consistent rulings that we're talking about the law in Midvale,

18

not about —

19

city to say that Mr. Haltom's store is a sexually oriented

20

business.

he's now trying to use a definition from another

I don't see how that's relevant.

21

THE COURT:

Well, this is argument.

22

MR. FAHLE:

I understand it's argument.

23

THE COURT:

He's entitled to talk about other statutes

24
25

if he believes they have relevance in argument.
MR. FAHLE:

So are you.

Yes, if he thinks they have relevance in

-3701

argument, I don't object to that.

2

it's improper argument.

A) it's not relevant and B)

3

THE COURT:

Why is it improper argument?

4

MR. FAHLE:

Because it doesn't —

it's not relevant to

5

this case what the definition under some other ordinance is of

6

an SOB.

7

say as long as you have less than 15 percent of floor space.

8
9

If it is, fine, we've got plenty of ordinances that

THE COURT:

I'm going to sustain the objection.

We're

not talking about Omaha or Missouri or Texas, we're talking

10

about the same county, in essence, but I'm going to just delete

11

this as an issue, counsel.

12
13

MR. HATHAWAY:

I think—

Well, that's fine, your Honor, as long

as the defendant himself, then, will be precluded from saying,

14 J "We've met somehow the floor space requirement that fit
15

within—"

16

THE COURT:

No, I'm not going to allow that.

17

MR. HATHAWAY:

That has been the discussion in prior

18

arguments, prior record, and there has been some evidence of

19

that having b e e n —
THE COURT:

20

That's why I was inclined to consider the

21

other ordinances in the same county, but I'm not going to do

22

so.

23

MR. HATHAWAY:

In short, and it really isn't, but at

24

the bottom, your Honor, the ordinance here requiring a business

25

engaged in sale of the product that was sold in this case is

-3941

don't have to conduct new studies but that they have to have

2

some studies in there is because the Supreme Court wasn't

3

particularly concerned with the scientific validity of these

4

studies or with whether or not they were being truthful or

5

accurately depicted the exact secondary effects within the city

6

where they were being applied.

7

legislative intent, if the legislature had that in mind.

8

only test for that, by the way, is to look at the legislative

9

record.

10

What they're concerned with is
The

Another case I would cite the Court to on that is the

11

FTW case out of Houston.

I do not have the cite off hand, it's

12

a F. Sub case, and that is currently up in the Fifth Circuit,

13

the City of Houston has appealed.

14

problem in that case, it's a very long published opinion in F.

15

Sub that explains that you've got to have something in there.

16

You don't have to do new studies.

That was precisely the

17

THE COURT:

Thank you.

18

Mr. Hathaway, do you want to respond to that last

19

issue?

20

question that's been raised about a legislative record.

21

seems to me that if the statute on its face or the ordinance

22

makes it clear what the intent was, that there is no need to

23

bring in a legislative history or legislative record.

24
25

You are entitled to the last word, and that is the

MR. HATHAWAY:

It

I believe that counsel argued unless

the concern is raised that for whatever reason the conclusion

-3951

is reached by the legislative body or not to support

2

(inaudible).

3

argued, "You're wrong, there's no common in crime increase,

4

there's no blight in the neighborhood, there's no sexually

5

transmitted disease."

That hasn't been challenged here.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. HATHAWAY:

Nobody has

So there's no need to rebut, then.
So that being the case, that having not

8

been challenged at all in any of these proceedings, the

9

findings —

and it's perfectly acceptable for Midvale City to

10

rely on the findings of other cities, other municipalities, as

11

it did, in reaching the conclusions that it reached.

12

THE COURT:

This Court is going to issue a memorandum

13

decision on the issues that have been addressed with

14

specificity.

15

this time, not detailed as the memorandum will be, but general

16

in nature.

However, I am going to make an oral ruling at

17

I find for the plaintiffs and dismiss the

18

counterclaim, finding that the defendants have not met their

19

burden of proof.

20

testimony that stands up on the issue of damages.

21

There has been no credible or really no

The only expert who was brought in to opine on this,

22

the only person who suggested that he had the credentials to do

23

so, the last witness of the plaintiffs, a rebuttal witness,

24

made it very clear that the data available makes it

25

impossible —

this was Mr. Rasmussen —

to arrive at a damage
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p(NEW APPLICATION
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BUSINESS LICENSE APPLICATION
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1. Hours of Operation
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.(Initial)
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Home Based Business: QYes

AS A MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY, MIDVALE CITY BEUEVES THAT COMMERCIAL
AND INDUSTRIAL ACTTVrTlES SHOULD BE CONDUCTED IN ZONES WHERE
THOSE ACTlVmES ARE SPECIFICALLY PERMITTED. HOWEVER, LIMITED
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ANY ZONE IN THE CrTY IF THE BUSINESS ACTIVITIES STRICTLY COMPLY WfTH
ALL HOME OCCUPATION REQUIREMENTS AS SET OUT IN MIDVALE CfTY CODE.
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Base Fee

s

Employee Fee

s

Units/Hooms Fee

$

Vehicle Fee

s

7<

1

O

Application Fee

BALANCE DUE

$ 15.00

$ ^
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ADDENDUM D

4&

MID VALE CITY

655 West Center Street
Midvale, Utah 84047
Phone (801) 567-7200
Fax (801) 567-0518

June 28, 2000

Doctor John's
John V Haltrom
6885 S State St
Midvale, Utah 84047
Dear Mr Haltrom,
This letter is to follow up the conversation that we had on June 28, 2000
Your business license application indicates that you were not operating a sexually
oriented business, however , during my inspection of your inventory I found several items
that indicate that your business would be considered sexually oriented The Picture Book
of Sensual Love, Super Glide, Mr Prolong and nude playing cards are examples of items
that lead me to believe that you intend to operate a sexually oriented business and I
suggest that you remove these and any similar items from your shelves if you are not
applying for a sexually oriented business license
I am enclosing a copy of Midvale City's sexually oriented business license ordinances
These ordinances state that you may not have anything which depicts or describes sexual
activities or specified anatomical areas, or instruments, devices or paraphernalia which are
designated for use in connection with specified sexual activities
Further, Midvale City requests a list of your inventory for our review of all items that you
intend to display or sell
Based on my inspection of your business inventory, your business license application
cannot at this time be approved due to the sexually oriented items I observed
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at 567-7213

Sincerely,

vZDUD^
Susan B Shreeve
Business License Administrator

ADDENDUM E
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Add'l Fee

DOCTOR JOHN'S INC.
6885 S. STATE ST
M1DVALE UT 84047

I

y-%

Suttafcit Uctnw Administrator

j Total Amount;
Paid:

ftacorrfer
NOTICE TM13 CERTKHCATg MUST Bg POSTED IN A CONSPICUOUS PLACE

NOT TRANSFERABLE
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$90 00

ADDENDUM F

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

COPY

CITY OF MIDVALE,
Plaintiff,

)

vs.

Case No. 00906120

JOHN HALTQM,
Defendant.

)

Judge's Ruling
Electronically recorded on
November 21, 2000

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE LESLIE LEWIS
Third District Court Judge

APPEARANCES t
For the Plaintiff:

For the Defendant:

PETER STIRSA
WILFORDJ3EESLEY
Stirba & Hathaway
215 South State Street
Suite 1150
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411o
Telephone: (801)364-8300
JOHN FAHLE
W. ANDREW McCULLOUGH
McCullough, Jones & Ivins
853 West Center Street
Orem, Utah 84058
Telephone: (801)328-2688

Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe, RPR/CSR/CCT

1771 South California Avenue
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801)377-0027
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2

(Electronically recorded on November 21, 2000)

3

THE COURT: All right.

I appreciate the high quality

4

of the oral argument.

5

written product that accompanies the same.

6

everything thoroughly, some of it twice, and I am of the

7

opinion that a temporary restraining order remaining in effect

8

until the trial is appropriate.

9

I appreciate the high quality of the
I have read

I am of the opinion that the applicant —

that is

10

Midvale —

11

of the ordinance.

12

8/16/2000 —

13

what this can do to a community, that it has a deleterious

14

effect on both the existing businesses around and surrounding

15

residential areas, causing increased crime, or I would add even

16

a potential increase of crime, and downgrading of property

17

value has been considered by this Court.

18

will suffer irreparable harm by the mere violation
The articulation in the ordinance dated

and it's the modified one —

where it talks about

In addition, the Court has a huge concern about a

19

business that is not advertised as a sexually oriented business

20

where children or young adults under 19 go into the business

21

because no one knows they're under 18, and some unassuming or

22

let us say naive adult is in the building , on the premises

23

without. knowing what it is, and is offended and harmed by what

24

is on display is a clear problem that is posed by this.

25

1 -*"sone

That

of the reasons it se^ros to iue why businesses that have

~3~

1 J sexually oriented materials ought to be designated a$ such,
2

I do not believe that Midvale or any other community

3 J has the right to keep sexually oriented businesses out of the
4

community, but merely that they have the right to regulate how

5 J those are operated by denying or granting a license, and they
6 J set standards for the granting of the licenses.
7 J

in this case I cannot find that there is anything

8 j inappropriate about the ordinance/ nor is there anything
9
10

overbroad or vague about the same.

language that would be commonly understood by a reasonable

11 J thinking person.
12 J language that is —
13

It is not complex language.

It is not

I guess what you would call legalese.

It is simple, understandable, everyday words,

14 I purpose," "sexually oriented."
15

The language in 5.S6 is

vv

Principal

Those are words that anyone

would understand and I so find.

16

Additionally, the threatened injury to the applicant

17 I that matters to which I just alluded in my opinion outweigh
IS j whatever damage or injury to the defendant that could occur.
19 I This Court finds that the damage to the defendant, if it
20

occurs, would be in the form of monetary damages, and if

21

ultimately the plaintiff, Midvale, does not prevail, then the

22 I defendants are entitled to damages.
23
24 I
25

It is this Court' s finding

that these damages would be monetary in nature.
It is also my perception and I so find that the
injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.

On the

MIDV01510
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contrary, I believe it supports the public's interest in

2

maintaining a community where there are regulations that do

3

not preclude the operations of businesses such as this, but

4 I set standards for appropriate operation of the same, so that
5 J members of the community that don't want to be exposed to this
6

have a choice before they are sort of confronted with what they

7 J may not want to see.

Again, the ordinance itself speaks about

8

the deleterious effects that are possible and perhaps even

9

likely.

10 I

Finally, the issue of whether or not there is the

11

substantial likelihood the applicant will prevail on the merits

12

is one I have considered.

13 I the original complaint.

I have read the amended complaint,
I have looked over the affidavitsw

14 I et cetera, and I have listened carefully to arguments from
15 I both sides.
16

It is my perception that there is a substantial

likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits.

17 J

Again, this Court finds that the statute or ordinance

18

is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad on its face.

In

19

fact, it appears to be consistent with other ordinances in the

20 I State of Utah in other communities that have never been taken
21 J up on appeal, never been tested, I suppose you could say, and
22

that have been found therefore to be acceptable to people

23

operating these businesses.

24 I

A sexually oriented business is one that holds itself

25 I out as an adult business.

I think in this case that probably

~5~

1

has occurred, or does exist in the sense that when you have

2

an individual posted at the door, which is what the defense

3

has so advised, taking the identification, checking for age,

4

monitoring who comes in and goes out, where you have in a

5

manner partitioned off that part of the business where sexually

6

oriented products are sold, it becomes clear chat the business

7 1 holds itself out differently.
8
9

While the name in and of itself does not suggest
that: itrs a sexually oriented business, I think a total

10 I consideration of the premises and the manner in which the
11 I business is operated makes that clear.
12
13

Additionally, the language of the statute is in the
alternative.

It holds itself out as an adult or sexually

14 J oriented business, or has sexually oriented products as a
15

principal part of the business' purpose.

16

We have discussed that throughout oral argument,

17 I where Counsel has been good enough to allow me to engage in
18 I a dialogue with them, and it appears clear to me that one of
19 I the principal purposes, of this business is to sell sexually
20 I oriented material.

The amount of material alluded to in the

21 I most recent affidavit —

I can't remember the name

22 I

MR. BUCKNER: This is Ms. Segal, your Honor.

23 I

THE COURT: Segal, thank you —

24

—

makes it clear that

there is a tremendous amount of product on the shelves.

25 I fact, it's increased.

In

I think 50 different kinds of dildos and

MD3V01512

-6all kinds of materials, and the character/ quality, quantity,
and nature of the same is sexually oriented, and you do not put
up a special partition, which costs money, and separates a
certain part of the store.

You do not hire a special employee

to stand at the gates, as it were, and say

XN

yay" or

NS

nay" to

people wishing to enter, if you don't have a strong interest,
and if in fact one of the principal business purposes is not to
display and sell sexually oriented material.
So this Court finds that for the purposes of today's
hearing in granting the temporary restraining order, that one
of the principal business purposes —

and its doesn't require

that it be the sole or the main business purpose, but just one
of the principal purposes —

is the sale of sexually oriented

material.
I think it's important to understand that there
does not, in this Court's opinion, appear to exist on "the
plaintiff's part, or this Court's part for that matter, a
desire to stop the defendant or other persons with similar
businesses from operating the business-

Rather there is, as

the ordinance points out, just a requirement that the business
is property licensed and properly run.
So minors and unsuspecting adult, and people who have
no interest in coming across these materials don't have to see
them, and have reasonable notice that it's there, and the
proper license should have been obtained and was not.

MIDV01513
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1 I

Initially the business was operating, and this Court

2

so finds, that these materials with a small amount on the

3

shelves had no license, and the Court so found-

4

obtained a license after removing all of the sexually oriented

They then

5 I materials, pursuant to a stipulation,
6

Immediately,- or fairly quickly after —

7 J remember the exact time frame —

I don't

agreeing to the conditions,

8 j the business license, they pur. the sexually oriented items
9

back on the shelves without ever obtaining a sexually oriented

10

business license, and the Court has considered that as well.

11

The language, as Mr. Stirba has pointed out, of the

12 J ordinance at issue.

It is not vague, in this Court's opinion,

13

nor is in overbroad.

I think Mr, Stirba's choice of words is

14

accurate.

The language allows some flexibility, but it also

15 1 has a clarity and a certainty and an understandability.

Anyone

16

looking at it, any person of common ordinary intelligence could

17

and would understand what the ordinance says, and so would

18 I therefore be on notice.
19 I

Therefore, based upon the totality for

today's

20 | purposes, I believe that a record ha$ been made, showing that
21 I the ordinance that's in place now, and has been modified to
22

sonva extent, was put into effect for a legitimate reason,

23 I exists based upon a legitimate basis, and that that legitimate
24 I basis was considered and in place at the time the ordinance was
25

passed, and the government interest in acting appropriately i$
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-8set fourth in the purpose section and in other parts of the
ordinance as it originally existed and as modified on August
16th of 2000.
Mr, Stirba, I'm going to ask you or Mr. Beesley to
prepare these findings, based upon my ruling, and an order*
(Court's ruling concluded.)
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-9REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH

)
) as.
)

I, Beverly Lowe, a Notary Public in and for the
State of Utah, do hereby certify:
That this proceeding was transcribed under my
direction from the transmitter records made of these
meetings,
That this transcript is full, true, correct, and
contains all of the evidence and all matters to which the
same related which were audible through said recording•
I further certify that I am not interested in the
outcome thereof.
That certain parties were not identified in the
recordr and therefore, the name associated with the
statement may not be the correct name as to the speaker.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 5rn day of December
2000.
My commission expires:
February 24 r 2004
BeyexTy
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Utah County
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